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CHRONICLERS IN THE FlEI.n OF 
CULTURAL PRODUCTION: COURTS, LAW 
AND THE INTERPRETIVE PROCESS 
LARRY CATA BACKER* 
This paper unearths the cultural basis ofjudicial authority in the project of 
producing and reproducing cultural norms, that is, the unconscious 
"common sense" of "things" from which we draw all rules of social conduct. 
It does so from two perspectives. The first considers authority from the per-
spective of the sorts of pronouncements of "law" that judges purport to 
make. The second looks to ingrained and submerged cultural patterns of 
"hearing" for the model by which individuals and societies in the West 
submit to and obey the judicial voice. Identification and memorialization 
provide the key to understanding the weightiness with which judicial speak-
ing is heard. Courts act judicially, and therefore say something worth hear-
ing, only when they engage in acts of identifjing and articulating points of 
social consensus. The very act of pronouncement serves to reinforce and 
memorialize the consensus articulated. But the weight given to judicial 
pronouncements also engages the hearer in the more subtle act of repeating 
and reinforcing basic cultural patterns of speaking and hearing. Courts 
pronounce in three different cultural voices: the Homeric, the Delphic, and 
the voices of Job's companions. The two Greek voices speak with measured 
tones and single-minded linear confidence; they are transmissions from the 
divine which must be obeyed. The voices of Job's companions adds a layer of 
messiness and conflict to the authority ofjudicial pronouncement. Biblical 
patterns of cultural speaking also create within the court the possibility of 
change. The courts provide a site for the articulation of prophetic voices. 
These are the voices, within and without the law, that are ,the harbingers of 
change. ' 
INTRODUCTION 
My purpose here is to explore the nature and process of norm 
making within culture as it is expressed through what we identify as 
"law." I do so by focusing both on law as an expression of cultural 
* Copyright © 2000 by Larry Cali Backer. Executive Director, Tulsa Comparative and 
International Law Center and Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., 
Columbia University (1982); M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University (1979); B.A., Brandeis University (1977). 
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standards/models/patterns regarded as mandatory, as well as on 
courts as a place from which these standards are articulated. My ob-
jective is twofold. First, I question the commonplace notion that law is 
something that "acts on" culture, i.e., that law disciplines culture. Sec-
ond, I show that, contrary to a most cherished late twentieth century 
Western delusion, neither our common law, our courts, nor our legis-
latures can serve as the engine that produces any sort of coercive law 
capable of transforming these standards/models/patterns. 
The construction of social norms is not a function of law. Nor 
does law create rules by which society governs itself. Law may confirm; 
it does not initiate} Law does not exist as an autonomous "legal" per-
son, independent of the social hegemonics from out of which it is 
produced. Law and social hegemonies are strategies by which power 
takes effect; each is the embodiment of a general design or institu-
tional crystallization of power.2 Law exists within and reflects the cul-
ture from which it operates. As Girardeau Spann suggests, "[T] he 
Court is institutionally incapable of doing anything other than 
reflecting the very majoritarian preference that the traditional model 
requires the Court to resist."3 It is, therefore, with some irony of rein-
terpretation that I subscribe to Foucault's observation of legal dis-
course as "essentially politico-historical, an indeterminately critical 
and, at the same time, extremely mythical discourse in which truth 
functions as a weapon to gain partisan victory. "4 
I propose a different way of understanding both law and the na-
ture of the authority with which courts pronounce law. Courts func-
tion as chroniclers of the norms through which people sharing a 
common culture understand themselves. The primary functions of 
courts are to identify cultural practice and then to memorialize that 
practice as law. Juridical expressions of law are essentially descriptive; 
standing alone, their pronouncements cannot coerce cultural prac-
tices. As such, law is an enterprise of affirmation. 
1 These notions are explored in more detail from the perspective of racial equity in 
Larry Cam Backer, Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society and Achieve Racial Equity, 
21 U. ARK. LImE ROCK LJ. 845 (1999) (1999 Altheimer Symposium on Racial Equity in 
the 21st Century) and from the perspective of sexual non-conformity in Larry Cam Backer, 
QJteering Theory: An Essay on the Conceit of Revolution in Law, in LEGAL QuEERIES: LESBIAN, 
GAY AND 'fRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 185 (Leslie J. Moran et al. eds., 1998). 
2 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 92-93 
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976). 
3 GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MI-
NORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 19 (1995). 
4 MICHEL FOUCAULT, REsUME DES COURS, 1970-198291 (1989). 
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Yet the juridical serves as an important site for the production 
and affirmation of culture. Courts are the great vehicle for the institu-
tionalization of cultural aesthetics on a perpetually grand scale. 
Courts speak authoritatively only in this sense, but the authority of the 
juridical in this enterprise of cultural aesthetics is both messy and 
complex. Society listens and learns because-and only when-it 
chooses to do so. Society internalizes what it hears to the extent it 
feels it must. The dynamics of this relationship between speaker and 
audience are deeply ingrained within ancient cultural patterns of the 
aesthetics of authoritative voice. To understand the function of law, 
one must first understand the cultural basis of juridical authority.5 
Courts engage in authoritatively cultural production using one of 
three voices: one of two Greek voices, the Homeric or the Delphic, or 
the Hebrew voice of the Biblical Job's companions. The two Greek 
voices speak with measured tones and single-minded linear 
confidence. The Homeric voice articulates tradition: it is the voice of 
repetition and reminder, the voice of our oral tradition. The Delphic 
voice speaks with the authority of the seeress touched by the divine. 
This voice articulates "that which is becoming," thus iliuminating 
value-movement within culture. The Biblical voice adds a layer of 
messiness and conflict to the authority of judicial pronouncements. 
The voices of Job's companions are always incomplete, flawed, or 
misdirected. We might listen to these voices with half an ear, and we 
might successfully rebel against it under the right circumstances. 
Stripping the divine from the voice that articulates, these Biblical 
voices provide a societal exit from the duty to obey and submit 
Each of these voices serves as a metaphor for deeply ingrained 
cultural patterns of speaking authoritatively. The voices are neither 
complementary nor reconcilable. The invocation of these deeply em-
bedded forms of authoritative voice confirms the authority of the 
courts to speak. Yet, embedded as well in the very form of voice 
through which the courts speak are the clearly drawn limitations of 
that authority. 
However, the authority of courts does not lie merely in their 
authority to pronounce. The courts themselves also function as a 
space in which the non juridical may speak with authority, for courts 
provide a site for the articulation of the Biblical voices of the proph-
5 "So, too, can we judge law aesthetically, according to the society it forms, the identi-
ties it defines, the preferences it encourages, and the subjective experience it enables. We 
can 'read' and criticize law as part of the making of a culture." Guyor Binder and Robert 
Weisberg, Cultural Criticism o/Law, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1149,1152 (1997). 
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ets. The courts are the platforms, their opinions the microphones 
through which voices such as those of Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Ezekiel 
speak to the people. Society has been culturally trained to respect, if 
not always to harken to the prophetic voice. For every moment when 
society acts like the cultural Hezekiah,6 there will be countless times 
when society listens to the prophetic like the BiblicalJezebel.7 
It is only in this culturally prophetic sense that courts exist as the 
place for the struggles and contestations which may produce cultural 
movement. In this arena, "losing" arguments are also articulated and 
memorialized. Thus produced, the prophetic find their way back into 
nonjudicial social discourse. In this function, and in this function 
onry, might courts indirectly serve as a means of cultural movement. A 
good American example isJustice Harlan's voice of dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.s Once articulated, this argument became a part of the cul-
tural dialogue suggesting an alternative vision of "what is." When that 
vision changed, the problem of the articulation of accepted social 
norms of race relations returned to the Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education.9 This time, however, the Court invoked its oracular voice to 
identify as the norm the cultural construct rejected in Plessy. It did so 
not because the Plessy dissent won the day as a matter of logic or juris-
prudence, but because the popular culture had embraced the notions 
articulated in that dissent.1o Thus, the Plessy dissent produced culture 
which produced law. 
Neither courts nor laws function as we have been taught to ex-
pect. An understanding of courts as chroniclers in the field of cultural 
production, as well as the site for the struggle over that production, 
tells us why. Once we understand courts as part of the process of cul-
tural production-that is, as the site for the identification and memo-
rialization of culture norms-we can focus more consciously on using 
them to engage in culture dialogue. 
6 For the story of Hezekiah, who was among the last of the obedient kings of Judah, 
see 2 ehron. 29:1-32:33. 
7 Jezebel has assumed meta-Biblical proportions. She is part of the pantheon of our 
Biblical archetypes, though most of us no longer understand the origins of the story. For 
the original, see 1 Kings 16:31 (leading Israel to sin by worshiping Baal); 2 Kings 9:30-37 
(life of treachery and ignominious death). 
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (arguing against the affirmation of the racial separate but equal 
doctrine. 
9 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting constitutional protection for doctrine of sepa-
rate but equal treatment of races). 
10 For a description of the changes, see Michael J. Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change, 
and the Civil Rights Movement," 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 13-75 (1994). 
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I begin by discussing the role of courts as the institution that 
identifies and memorializes norms in the form of law. I then explore 
the identification-memorialization process in two contexts. The first 
context is that of the European Court of Human Rights' margin of 
appreciation jurisprudence, and the second is that of the construction 
of general principles of community law by the European Court of Jus-
tice. Identification-memorialization engages the courts in the process 
of cultural production to the extent that courts speak or provide a site 
for authoritative articulation. 
I then explore the culturally evocative voices that courts use. 
These voices-the Homeric, Delphic, and Jobian cacophony-de-
scribe the complex and dynamic interactions between law, courts, and 
culture. Our judges function as a discordant and polyphonic cultural 
choir. From this choir will come articulations of cultural reality-more 
or less authoritative, more or less temporary, and more or less clear-
in the form of rules and consequences for breaking taboos. Courts 
also and simultaneously serve as a site for challenging the authority to 
voice and patrol social and political space. To the victor of these 
struggles belongs a greater authority to pronounce convincingly those 
standards/patterns/models of the normal which may be enforced by 
the countless disciplines marshaled by society for that purpose. 
I end by suggesting some complexity in this seemingly simple aes-
thetics of norm and authority. Complexity and ambiguity follow from 
our understanding that courts may speak simultaneously in multiple 
voices. Neither society nor "law" provides an unimpeachable arbiter of 
these voices. Society can never know for sure which voice speaks 
"truth," even momentary "truth." At the most general level of com-
plexity, I eliminate the simplifying constraint that culture exists in 
unique spaces. Culture itself must be understood in the plural, even 
when the institutions of cultural production are conceived in the sin-
gular. The culture in which courts operate shares space with multiple 
competing cultures. The struggle over the authority of one culture to 
speak for the others in its midst through the institutions of formalized 
power suggests a complex and dynamic interaction that, in turn, af-
fects the authority of courts to speak. 
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I. THE METHODOLOGY OF CHRONICLING: IDENTIFICATION AND 
MEMORIALIZATION OF THE CULTURAL PRESENT 
Culture functions "as a meta-system by containing within it all 
possibilities, all combinations, possible given the set of basic assump-
tions which define a group as 'distinct."'ll Popular culture is the way 
in which we selectively and collectively evidence culture in practice. 
Popular culture represents the production of culture at any particular 
time; it represents merely an implementation of the possibilities in-
herent in culture, not the totality of the possibilities of culture itself. 
We implement culture individually and collectively through an end-
less attempt at replication. In this sense, popular culture can be un-
derstood as the "prejudices," or what I would characterize as value 
choices, of the extant communal tradition. I2 Such is the fundamental 
nature of our interpretive community.I3 
Courts and law participate in the production and replication of 
popular culture. However, neither courts nor law participate as one 
would expect-as the engine through which popular culture can be 
directed and transformed. We now understand better what Gerald 
Rosenberg meant when he said that "the conditions enabling courts 
to produce significant social reform will seldom be present because 
courts are limited by ... constraints built into the structure of the ... 
political system."14 The Courts are "institutionally incapable of doing 
anything other than reflecting the very majoritarian preferences that 
the traditional model requires the court to resist. "15 Instead, courts 
11 Larry Catli Backer, Constructing a ''Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narra-
tive, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in the United States and British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REv. 529, 
542 n.32 (1996). 
12 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,TRuTH AND METHOD 302, 305-07 (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989). 
13 See STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class? in Is THERE A '!EXT IN THIS CLAss? 
303-04 (1980). 
14 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 35 (1991); Larry Catli Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial Trans-
mogrification of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTER-
DISC. LJ.611, 657 n.169, 658 n.174. 
15 SPANN, supra note 3, at 19 (1995); see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: 
Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REv. 61, 93-94 (1996); ROSENBERG, supra note 14, at 
35. For Professor Rosenberg, the American judicial system is constrained by its limited 
constitutional rights, lack of (true) judicial independence, and lack of judicial power to 
implement decisions. See ROSENBERG, supra note 14, at 35. As such, significant social re-
form is possible only when there is ample legal precedent for change, where there is ex-
plicit or implicit substantial support for change within the other branches of government, 
and where there is general citizen support or the lack of effective citizen opposition to the 
change. See id. However, even when all these conditions are met, judicial social change is 
2000] Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production 297 
engage in the field of cultural production as chroniclers. Their func-
tion is to declare and preserve culture. They do not function to create 
or transform. Theirs is a passive function-to provide a post facto im-
primatur to the current iteration of popular culture. The courts' con-
tribution to the production of culture is thus the very declaration 
"what is," or "what is becoming." Except in the popular imagination, 
courts do not engage in the struggle over "what might be." 
Thus, one of the primary post facto functions of the court is to 
identify the current normative framework of popular culture. This 
normative framework is at once "law" and the basis on which "law" 
can be "named." It is the process of becoming conscious of "what is" 
as opposed to a process of imposing "that which was not. "16 Law, as 
the description of existing social norms identified by courts, is some-
thing very different from our popular conception of law as the creation 
of courts which make law for the purpose of changing conduct. 
The notion of courts as some sort of agent for social change has 
developed a certain currency among so-called traditionalists in the 
United States. In a well~nown book, former judge and failed Su-
preme Court nominee, Robert Bork, bitterly attacks the notion of 
courts as a "legislative" power, one that imposes its personal views on 
an unwilling population,l7 Of course, this argument draws much from 
liberal criticism during the 1960s of the process-oriented theories of 
the 1940s and 1950s,18 At the same time, several generations of social 
not possible unless there exist positive incentives for change, costs can be imposed for 
non-compliance, market implementation is possible, or the other branches of government 
are willing to implement judicially mandated reform. See id. at 35-36. 
16 There is some value to the concepts inherent in "speech act theory" in this notion of 
identification. It is not necessarily that one makes things true simply by saying them, asJ.L. 
Austin might suggest. See generally, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN; How TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 
(1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
(1969). In this form the notion of the significance of the attributes of judges and judicial 
decisions is made too independent of the norm matrix within which they operate. I believe 
it is more accurate to suggest that one becomes more conscious of a thing, that one 
heightens its reality, simply by uttering it. This is the difference between acknowledgment as 
a conscious act and creation as a conscious act. 
17 See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
18 See generally, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER EUTE (1956) (military and business 
elites are the only groups effectively participating in governance); HENRY S. KARIEL, THE 
DECUNE OF AMERICAN PLURAUSM (1961) (organized labor and management hijacked 
governance, capturing the agencies designed to regulate them); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRI-
VATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966) (powerful interest groups captured the 
administrative mechanisms of government and imposed their will on the "people"); 
GABRIEL Koum, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963) (the entire administrative state 
was designed not to regulate, but to be the means by which the "regulated" could maxi-
mize their positions in society). 
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activists, composed mostly of the traditional "left," as well as identity 
and interest groups, have also come to believe that courts are a viable 
means of radical social change.19 Indeed, the seeming ability of Afri-
can-Americans to use the courts in the United States to win equal 
treatment and coerce integration has assumed archetypical propor-
tion. 
Despite the hopes of these groups, and the fears of conservatives, 
most attempts to impose judicially ordered changes in social norms 
have been miserably unsuccessful. For instance, judicial activism has 
yet to coerce Americans into recognizing that citizens have a funda-
mental right to social benefits.2o The courts have yet to impose an ob-
ligation on Americans to accept gay men and lesbians as citizens.21 
Similarly, American courts have shied away from strictly rationing 
economic benefits or business benefits on the basis of race.22 Some 
American critical race theorists have come to accept the notion, if 
somewhat reluctantly, that the judiciary cannot successfully compel 
radical change.23 
Even those decisions advertised as models of successful judicial 
social compulsion-for example, abortion rights, gender equality in 
the workplace and school, and workplace integration-confirmed, 
but did not change, whatever emerging social consensus there might 
,have been at the time of the decisions. Thus, such "successes" were 
not really successes at all. School desegregation, it is true, has been 
compelled by Brown v. Board of Education. 24 Brown did articulate a so-
19 See MARGARET WIER ET AL., THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
4-5 (1988); see also Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: 
WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65-67 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) ("Suppose a 
welfare system offered an adequate grant to all those in need (with income below it), and a 
right to refuse work which paid less than the welfare grant. If, as a result, private business 
and government were forced to reorganize the economy to ensure that it provided pur-
poseful and well-paying work, would not this be desirable?"); Edward V. Sparer, The Role of 
the WI1lfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.LA. L. REv. 361, 366-67 (1965). 
20 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 455-87 (1970) (rejecting argument that 
constitution guarantees right to welfare benefits); see generally Larry Cati Backer, Poor Relief, 
Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1. 
21 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986). 
22 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39 (1995) (questioning 
constitutionality of federal minority set aside programs for contracts questioned and re-
manding for further consideration) . 
23 See, e.g., SPANN, supra note 3, at 19. See generally Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second 
Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183 (1993). 
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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cial .consensus of the highest aspirations of American society.25 Yet, 
almost fifty years after that decision, American society continues to 
resist the coercive power of Brown. The decision has altered residen-
tial patterns and rates of private school attendance, and increased the 
allure of "states rights" politics. The decision has substantially failed to 
force integration of American public schools. The courts appear 
ready to abandon that effort.26 Likewise, Roe v. Wade27 permitted 
women the right to an abortion. However, twenty-five years after the 
decision, changing patterns of social organization and norms have 
significantly increased the difficulty of obtaining even a "legal" abor-
tion. Medical schools do not emphasize instruction in abortion pro-
cedures, hospitals do not permit the procedure, and fewer doctors 
perform the service for fear of retaliation.28 
Indeed, a great sin of modernist liberal theory is to confuse the 
identification of law with the creation of law. Our modernist com-
monplace is that courts "create" law. This lazy commonplace misun-
derstands the very real differences between identification and crea-
tion. Identification postulates the existence a priori of the conduct 
norm encompassed by judiciallaw-making. As such, the act of cultural 
production by courts is in the naming of the norm identified. This 
identification is significant but of a vastly different order than that of 
the wholesale creation of law. Creation, in contrast, assuID:es the inde-
pendence of law and its power to assert independent coercive effects 
on society and social behavior. In this guise, law, like corporations, 
becomes something apart from the society that created it, and it af-
fects society as an embedded but independent entity. However, there 
is also a touch of the divine in this anthropomorphized conception of 
law. For having achieved a status outside of the body of the society on 
which it acts, this conceptualization of law also assumes a primary 
place in the social hierarchy. Law assumes the place once held in tra-
ditional societies by God or the sovereign. In the West, this sort of 
25 "We might understand Broum as designed not to accomplish actual integration, but 
to establish a fundamental principle of constitutional law. " Mark Tushnet, The Si!fl1ificance 
of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 123, 176 (1994). 
26 See generally, e.g., Bradley W. joondeph, Missouri v. jenkins and the De Facto Abandon-
ment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REv. 597 (1996); KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985). 
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
28 The popular press is full of stories of this social regulation-strangulation-of abor-
tion. See, e.g., Michael Remez, Abortion: The Enduring Debate, HARTFORD CouRANT,jan. 18, 
1998, at AI. 
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transformation of the law into divinity has been hailed as good-the 
"rule oflaw" is God.29 
Thus, courts created neither Plessy v. Ferguson30 nor Brown v. Board 
of Education31 half a century later. Each decision was heavily embedded 
in the popular culture of the time. Yet because the courts articulated 
the norms giving rise to the rulings in those cases, we have tended to 
treat the norms as having been created by the courts. These ways of 
perceiving law-making implicate Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the 
"power of naming" in the juridical field. 32 
Symbolic acts of naming achieve their power of creative ut-
terance to the extent, and only to the extent, that they pro-
pose principles of vision and division objectively adapted to 
the pre-existing divisions of which they are the products .... 
In other words, the specific symbolic effect of the represen-
tations, which are produced according to schemas adapted 
to the structures of the world which produce them, is to 
confirm the established order. 33 
The civil law does not escape the bifurcation. It is true enough 
that civil law courts have only admitted to functioning as interpreters 
of the law created by the sovereign. However, even here, civil courts 
identifY and memorialize social common understandings. The inter-
pretive power of the civil courts is never as innocent as it might sound 
in theory. Interpretation provides an excellent vehicle for conforming 
the word of the sovereign to the common practice ofthe citizen.34 
In other words, the judge will have to conform his decisional 
output to election-day results. This criterion implies that, al-
29 The "rule of law" concept, though venerated as a means of protecting people 
against the whims of individuals with power, has also been attacked as a falsely neutral and 
universal construct used by dominant society to oppress other groups. See generally Richard 
Delgado, Rodgrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. 
PA. L. REv. 379 (1994). The irony, of course, is that a concept bound up in the social con-
sensus which rose up after World War II and had as its aim the reduction of individual 
discretion, has been attacked as a means of subordinating groups which now resist the 
universalism of law and demand exemption from its strictures for them (but not for those 
who would otherwise be bound). 
:lO 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
~1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
~2 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HAST-
INGS LJ. 814, 837-39 (1987). 
3~ Id. at 839. 
M See general~ Mitchel de s.-O.-rE. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:JudiciaIDiscourse in the 
French Legal System, lO4 YALE LJ. 1325 (1995). 
2000] Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production 
though a judge should never act as the red-robed puppet of 
the powerful, it is equally indisputable that judicial authority 
and legitimacy will erode if, for lengthy periods of time, the 
judge pursues policies which fly in the face of some prevail-
ing value-<:onsensus in society. 35 
301 
Moreover, as in common law countries, the sovereign, that is, those 
institutions with the theoretical authority to "pronounce the law," are 
subject to the same constraint-the practical authority of social prac-
tice. The Roman Catholic Church, the quintessential civilian jurisdic-
tion, may well have commanded priestly celibacy from the time of the 
collapse of the Western Roman Empire, yet for centuries the power of 
that enactment extended no further than the codices on which it was 
written.36 The former codices of Spain and France are littered with 
the detritus of commandments of the sovereign which were dead let-
ter from the date of enactment.37 
The second primary post facto function of courts is to memorialize 
the norms identified as law. Memorialization serves several important 
functions. On one level, the project of memorialization stabilizes the 
court's message and makes it appear immutable. On another level" 
memorialization provides a place through which identification can,be 
transmitted. This process, however, also creates another significant 
confusion of liberal modernist theory: the fact of memorializing does 
not make more solid or enduring that which was memorialized. 
Though judicial pronouncement once made may be "etched in 
stone," the cultural matrix that gives it immediacy of meaning is "sand 
in the wind. "38 Memorialization cannot slow the process of the pro-
35 Hjalte Rasmussen, Betwerm Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European 
Court, 13 EUR. L. REv. 28, 37 (1988). 
36 On the slow enforcement of priestly celibacy in the Middle Ages, see generally JAMES 
A. BRUNDAGE, LAw, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987). 
37 Indeed, social scientists sometimes use the rate of reenactment of pre-Revolutionary 
statutes as an indication of the continued existence and intractability of the "problems" the 
statutes were enacted to "correct" without considering seriously that such laws were either 
enforceable or did much to change social behavior. See grmerally LINDA MARTZ, POVERTY 
AND WELFARE IN HABSBURG SPAIN: THE EXAMPLE OF TOLEDO (1983). 
38 The problem of memorialization is especially acute with words first uttered in lan-
guages no longer used or now changed beyond recognition. Consider the problem of Bib-
lical hermeneutics in the context of a long dead world the hand of which reaches to the 
present. This problem is especially acute with respect to text with attempts to mediate be-
tween our Greek and Semitic selves. See grmerally DANIEL BOYARIN, A RADICAL JEW: PAUL 
AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (1997). Even "modern" translations are prone to this ef-
fect. The King James translation of the Bible no longer reflects common English usage or 
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duction and reproduction of culture. The modernist suggests that law 
freezes culture. 
Memorialization preserves a record of shared norms at the time 
of their making. Reuel Schiller has demonstrated well the process of 
identification and memorialization in the context of labor law.39 Dur-
ing the period after World War II, the Supreme Court applied the 
norms flowing from notions of group pluralist process to construct a 
system of labor management interaction within the parameters of the 
labor laws. A social consensus had developed during that time which 
reflected a common understanding that "democratic politics were 
driven by interest group interactions, with the government as a passive 
agent, responding to their desires. "40 As a result, the Supreme Court 
constructed rules of exclusive representation,41 a very limited ap-
proach to fair representation,42 and a concentration on the free 
speech rights of unions over the speech rights of union members.43 By 
the 1960s, social consensus had shifted. A participatory rights based 
policy-making ideal had replaced the group pluralist ideal. Many of 
the constructions of the basic rules of labor-management engagement 
formulated in the period before 1960 were reformulated in light of 
the new ideal.44 In neither case, though, did the Supreme Court at-
tempt to coerce from labor or management a way of understanding 
the norms of such relationships at odds with their conception of how 
such relationships ought to work. 
Memorialization touches on what Bourdieu describes as "this 
special linguistic and social power of the law 'to do things with 
words''':45 
the social habits that inform them. It thus becomes increasingly irrelevant because it can-
not speak to the reader. . 
39 See generally Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor 
Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999). 
40 Id. at 15. "It also harmonized with many basic values of American democracy such 
as self-determination, limited government, and Madisonian liberal group pluralism." Id. at 
29. 
41 SeeJ.l. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1944) (workers do not have right to 
advance their interests independent of the union which represents them). 
42 See Steele v. Louisville N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,207-08 (1944); Schiller, supra note 39, 
at 34-44. 
43 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 
(1945); Schiller, supra note 39, at 34-44. 
44 See Schiller, supra note 39, at 75-112. 
45 Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward 
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 805, 809 (1987). 
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This power inheres in the law's constitutive tendency to jar-
malize and to codify everything which enters its field of vi-
sion .... [Bourdieu] argues that this formalization is a cru-
cial element in the ability of the law to obtain and sustain 
general social consent, for it is taken (however illogically) as 
a sign of the law's impartiality and neutrality, and hence of 
the intrinsic correctness of its determinations.46 
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However, impartiality and neutrality are functions as much of the 
court's limited purpose or competence to declare as it is of the court's 
task of memorialization. There is much truth to Bourdieu's insight on 
legal formalization: 
There is no doubt that the law possesses a specific efficacy, 
particularly attributable to the work of codification, of formu-
lation and formalization, of neutralization and systematiza-
tion, which all professionals at symbolic work produce ac-
cording to the laws of their own universe. Nevertheless, this 
efficacy, defined by its opposition both to pure and simple 
impotence and to effectiveness based only on naked force, is 
exercised only to the extent that the law is socially recog-
nized and meets with agreement, even if only tacit and par-
tial, because it corresponds, at least apparently, to real needs 
and interests.47 
Yet, I think this insight better serves when it is turned on its head. Be-
cause legal text must correspond to "real needs and interests," it is 
perceived as socially productive: The formalization-the memorializa-
cion of its social text-becomes efficacious within the field of cultural 
production. 
Chronicling, then, in the form of the identification-
memorialization methodologies of courts in the production of law, 
suggests that the cultural product of courts is both socially produced 
and socially productive.48 Yet, the "magisterial discourse"49 of the 
courts at least appears to be the opposite of what Jean-Francois Lyo-
tard has posited for this core institution of the Western Enlighten-
46 Id. at 809-10. 
47 Bourdieu, supra note 32, at 840. 
48 For a discussion of the way in which courts produce culture through law, and law 
produces culture through courts, see generally Backer, supra note 11. 
49 Jean Fran~ois Lyotard, On the Strength of the Weak, 3 SEMIOTEXTE 204,205 (1978). 
Lyotard, of course, refers to philosophy-but what more systematic philosophy than the 
jurisprudence of a cohesive system of courts? 
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ment modernist project. For Lyotard, this magisterial discourse of the 
courts concocts those socially coercive stories which have passed for 
western foundationalist reality since the time of the French Revolu-
tion. Worse, the stories are false-at least to the extent they evidence 
more the power of the story teller to define the parameters of the 
narrative than the reality of the narrative's object(s). Mirroring the 
pattern of imposition established by the master narratives of Western 
thought, the magisterial narratives uttered by courts are authoritative 
because courts take on the power not only to utter narrative, but also 
to determine "the conditions of truth" against which these narratives 
are to be tested.5o 
Authoritative utterances, including judicial utterances, then serve 
to limit and coerce. These utterances are unproblematic as such but 
for the fact that they bear no relationship to the "will of the coerced." 
It follows, for those who adhere to this view, that this form of post-
modernist project constructs authoritative utterances as an imperial 
and colonizing evil. Consequently, the authority of the magisterial 
voice must be rejected, or at least resisted, as an excluding voice. An 
inversion of voices should follow, perhaps investing the weak with the 
mantle of authority of the magistrate.51 Ironically, this sort of argu-
ment minimizes the postmodernist project to the role of cultural 
prophet. As such, postmodernism becomes an actor within culture 
rather than a site for creation of an alternative meta-narrative. 
Moreover, if the mechanics of the exercise of the magisterial 
voice I have outlined above are correct, then perhaps we must prob-
lematize this postmodernist notion of "master narrative." It is far too 
easy to demonize this Western foundationalism in a simplistic man-
ner.52 It is wrong to consider this narrative as both fundamentally 
50 See id. Lyotard posits that such master narratives can be subverted through the cri-
tique within philosophical discourse of the foundationalisms of philosophy "in order to 
impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable." JEAN FRANC;:OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMOn-
ERN CONSTITUTION: A REpORT ON KNOWLEDGE 81 (1984). 
51 See Lyotard, supra note 49, at 207. 
52 Indeed, it has become common to construct out of Western foundationalism a mas-
ter narrative which, it is asserted, is somehow imposed from the outside on willing and 
unwilling alike. We are all, in effect, prisoners of a totalizing world view which is neither 
ours nor good for us. This meta-narrative is then invested with extreme power; it is con-
structed as the primary source of what is perceived to be evil in the world. Consider the 
way master narrative is used to explain race relations among "minorities" within the 
United States. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of Afiican 
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles, • 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581 
(1993) (describing tensions between the Mrican-American and Korean-American com-
munities in Los Angeles before the 1992 riots in the context of m,yority notions of race 
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"false" and "imposed" on the social consciousness by the conscious 
design of some cabal privileged by the web of social relations, which 
uses narrative to maintain its privilege within the web by the manipu-
lation of truth and the "foundations of social organization." As the 
sections which follow demonstrate, the reality may be more subtle and 
less binary, less gnostically Christian, than what postmodern theory 
would have us accept. 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE IDENTIFICATION-MEMORIALIZATION 
PROJECT OF THE COURTS: UNDERSTANDING WHAT WE Do 
The process of identification-memorialization by which courts 
participate in the field of cultural production can be appreciated 
more fully in context. For that purpose, I propose looking briefly at 
two clear manifestations of this process:5!l the "margin of apprecia-
tion" jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
construction of general principles of community law by the European 
Court of Justice. 
A. Margins of Appreciation in the Construction of European Human 
Rights 
Europe has invested a great deal of effort in the creation of a su-
pra-national system for the protection of fundamental rights of indi-
viduals. These protections are memorialized in a Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Conven-
tion).54 The guardian and oracle of this system is ultimately the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The recent "transsexual cases" 
of the ECHR55 illuminate the ways in which the ECHR has incorpo-
and place); Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 751, 754 
(1992) ("Postmodern critique might be thought of as a strategy for bringing to the surface 
suppressed narratives and voices drowned out by the univocal projection of master narra-
tives."). 
5S American courts also manifest this process of identification-memorialization, espe-
cially in the interpretation of our Constitution, but the process is more subtle. See grmerally 
Larry Cam Backer, Fairness as a General Principk of American Constitutional Law: Applying 
Extra-Constitutional Principks to Constitutional Cases in Hendrick and M.L.B., 33 TuLSA LJ. 
135 (1997) [hereinafter Fairness as a GeneraIPrincipk]. 
54 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
55 See generally Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990); Rees v. United 
Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R Rep. 56 (1987). In Cossey, a person born male, who underwent gen-
der reassignment surgery and lived as a woman, challenged the denial by the United 
Kingdom of her request to obtain both a birth certificate indicating she was female and a 
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rated the basic principle of identification within its decision-making 
process. Fundamental to the interpretive project of the ECHR is the 
"margin of appreciation" doctrine.56 The ECHR has explained that 
where there exists "little common ground between the Contracting 
States," national entities enjoy "a wide margin of appreciation. "57 The 
ECHR, in effect, will interpret the actual content of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed under the Convention principally on the basis of 
the norms common to the peoples bound by the Convention. Where 
no such common understanding exists, the ECHR will not strain to 
impose an interpretation which compels substantial change of social 
ha~it. Change must come first; law follows. "Although some contract-
ing States would now regard as valid a marriage between a person in 
Miss Cossey's situation and a man, the developments which have oc-
curred to date cannot be said to evidence any general abandonment 
of the traditional concepts of marriage. "58 Thus, "margin of apprecia-
tion" works as a limiting principle on the European supra-national 
human rights regime. The limit, in this case, is common understand-
ing of what is generally accepted among those bound by law. The 
primary function of the ECHR is to confirm social behavioral norms 
"which are." 
Yet, the very lack of nation-state consensus, which gives the mar-
gin of appreciation its widest power to limit the interpretive power of 
the ECHR, can sometimes serve as a vehicle to overcome the domina-
tion of that principle-especially where consensus, while divided, is 
interpreted to be changing in a particular direction. In this role, and 
in this role only, does the ECHR exercise a power to identity "what is 
becoming." For example, in the transsexual cases, the consensus gap 
transformed itself into something problematic when the European 
repeal of the legal restriction on her ability to marry a man. See 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622. The 
European Court of Human Rights held over vigorous dissent that there had been no viola-
tion of either Articles 8 or 12. See id. at 641-42. In Rees, a person born female, who under-
went medical treatment and lived as a man, challenged the denial by the United Kingdom 
of his request to obtain a birth certificate indicating he was male. See generally 9 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 56. The European Court of Human Rights held over vigorous dissent that there had 
been no violation of either Article 8 or 12. See id. at 68. . 
56 On the margin of appreciation doctrine generally, see, e.g., Pieter van Dijk, The 
Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE: .ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN 
LAw AND POLICY 179 (1993); Joxerramon Bengoetxea & Heike Jung, Towards a European 
Criminal Jurisprudence? The Justification of Criminal Law lJy the Strasbourg Court, 11 LEGAL 
STUD. 239-80 (1991). 
57 Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 641; Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 64. 
58 Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 642 (discussing the Article 12 challenge). 
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Court of Human Rights became "conscious of the seriousness of the 
problems facing transsexuals and the distress they suffer. Since the 
Convention always has to be interpreted and applied in the light of 
current circumstances, it is important that the need for appropriate 
legal measures in this area should be kept under review. "59 "Current 
circumstances" analysis permits the European Court of Justice some 
discretion to balance the interests of the community and the individ-
ual, "the search for which balance is inherent in the whole of the 
Convention."60 However, when the balance tilts in favor of the indi-
vidual, the margin of appreciation disappears. Essentially this "current 
circumstances" analysis permits the ECHR the ability to reinterpret 
the bare words of the rights inscribed in otherwise immutable statutes 
in light of emerging social mores. A consensus gap pointing the way 
to a particular new social consensus, of course, was also what the dis-
sentingjudges argued in Cossey.61 
The power to reinterpret the immutable, t9 articulate the emerg-
ing consensus, was the essence of the ECHR's interpretive odyssey in 
the "homosexual sodomy" cases.62 During the first ten years of the 
Convention, several applications were filed against the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany challenging Article 175 of its penal code, which pro-
hibited adult homosexual sodomy. Until recently, the Strasbourg tri-
bunals rejected all of these applications because the laws were 
deemed necessary for the protection of morals.6!! The ECHR also took 
comfort in the sanitizing language ofmedicine.64 
59Id. at 641; see Rees, 9 Eur. HR Rep. at 68. 
60 Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 64. 
61 See Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 at 648 (Martens,]., dissenting). The "current cir-
cumstances" approach is never exact. A determination of consensus is always tentative. 
From this weakness, a number of criticisms of the margin of appreciation doctrine have 
emerged. Most of the criticisms have centered on the arbitrariness of the principle, at least 
in its application. See Larry Cata Backer, InscribingJudicial Preferences into Our Fundamental 
Law: On the Inrorparation European Principle of Margins of Appreciation as Constitutional Juris-
prudence in the U.S., 7 TuLSA COMPo & INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 2000). For a discussion of 
the criticisms and defenses of margin of appreciation theory, see id. at n.98-106. 
62 See generally Dudgeon V. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981); Norris V. Ire-
land, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988); Modinos V. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993). For a 
discussion of the political nature of the determination of the limitations of "human rights" 
in this context, see generally Backer, supra note 61. 
63 See, e.g., App. No. 1307/61, 1962 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 230, 234 (Eur. 
Comm'n on Human Rts.); App. No. 530/59, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 184, 194 
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rts.); App. No. 104/55, 1955-57 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 
228,229 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rts.). 
64 See, e.g., App. No. 5935/72, 1976 3 Eur. Comm'n HR Dec. & Rep. 46 (esp. 153-56) 
(1976). For a discussion of the cases, see, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Note, Finding a Consen-
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Norris v. Ireland defined the parameters of the newly recognized 
political reality.65 Thereafter, the cases were not hard. In Europe, 
popular cultural norms, the habits of ordinary European citizens, make 
it exceedingly difficult to find particularly serious reasons that create a 
pressing social need to criminalize sexual activity between men. Be-
fore the court, the government argued that the "moral fibre of a 
democratic nation is a matter for its own institutions and the Gov-
ernment should be allowed a degree of tolerance, ... a margin of ap-
preciation that would allow the democratic legislature to deal with 
this problem in the manner which it sees best."66 The court rejected 
this argument, stating that to make such a determination, "the reality 
of the pressing social need must be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. "67 The court rebuffed the government's attempt to pre-
clude it from review of Ireland's obligation not to interfere with an 
Article 8 right when it deals with the "protection of morals." The 
Court also noted that serious reasons must exist before government 
interference can be legitimate for purposes of Article 8. Once again, 
citing a portion from Dudgeon v. United Kingdom regarding the lack of 
evidence showing that the non-enforcement of Northern Ireland's 
relevant law' had been detrimental to the moral standards of its peo-
ple or that there was public demand for stricter enforcement of the 
law, the court held that "it cannot be maintained that there is a 'press-
ing social need' to make such [homosexual] acts criminal offenses."68 
Yet in none of these cases did the ECHR attempt an "empty" in-
terpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention. Each of the 
cases provided the usual context for interpretation: the European 
Court of Human Rights constructed a context for interpretation 
based on the social customs and understandings of the people on 
whom the interpretation falls. Interpretation in the context of margin 
of appreciation analysis is little more than identification and memori-
alization of current practice. More than that, however, it amounts to a 
conscious assurance that the "law" applied will always be contextual-
ized within current social habits; the law will "evolve." 
sus on Equality: The H011UJsexual Age of Consent and the Eumpean Convention of Human Rights, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1044, 1079 (1990). 
65 See generally 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). 
66 Id. 'I 42. 
67 Id. 'I 44. 
68 Id. 'I 46. 
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B. General Principles of Community Law 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established the practice 
of fashioning substantially extra-constitutional principles, which it 
then applies to its interpretation of the "quasi-constitution" of the 
European Union (EU) as "General Principles of Community Law. "69 
Principles of law are rules of conduct "prescribed in the given circum-
stances and carrying a.sanction for noncompliance. "70 General rules 
or principles work like doctrine "though they can be vindicated like 
any particular rule, they serve a dual purpose: as pointers to interpre-
tation by the courts and as indication of policy to legislators."71 As 
such, "new principles are adopted into law through judicial decision 
making. "72 
Of course, the primary sources of European law may appear to 
provide at least some small theoretical opening through which the 
69 The issues of the origin, use, and limitations of the concept "general principles of 
Community law" remain controversial in Europe. I do not discuss those questions here. 
For a general discussion of the genesis of principles of Community law, see, e.g., D. LASOK 
& j.W. BRIDGE, LAw & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 179-208 (5th ed., 
1991); NICHOLAS EMIuou, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAUTY IN EUROPEAN LAw: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 115-33 (1996); joxERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 71-79 
(1993); see gmerallyjoseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: S01TU! Questions Concerning the 
Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Funda1TU!ntal Human Rights Within the 
Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103 (1986). 
70 For the difference between general principles of law and legal doctrines, see LASOK 
& BRIDGE, supra note 69, at 179 (doctrine encompasses general propositions or guidan~e 
of a general nature) . 
71 Id. On the interpretive and supra-constitutional utility of principles in continental 
(and especially European) law, see, e.g., j. 19uartua, Sobre "Principios" y "Positivismo Legal-
ista", 14 REVISTA VASCA DE LA AnMINISTRACI6N PUBUCA (1986); cf. gmerally LON L. 
fuLLER, THE MORAllTY OF LAw (1969). Emiliou suggests four applications of general 
principles in constitutional interpretation: to guide to interpretation of primary law, to 
guide to the exercise of power under the primary law, to provide criteria for determining 
the legality of acts, and to fill in gaps in primary or secondary law to prevent injustice. See 
EMIUOU, supra note 69, at 121. 
72 NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 236-37 (1978). Taking 
his cue from MacCormick,joxerramon Bengoetxea suggests that general principles, in the 
form of norms, assume supra-constitutional dimension: 
Political or ethical principles sometimes enter into the legal system disguised 
as supra-systemic principles allegedly referred to or implied by valid norms of 
the system or by formal interpretive consequences of these. If such principles 
are incorporated into the legal system, e.g. through a court decision, they 
might be considered as reasons guiding further decisions, for principles are 
regarded as general norms having an explanatory and justificatory force in 
relation to particular decisions or to particular rules for decisions. 
BENGOETXEA, supra note 69, at 75, citing MACCORMICK, supra, at 260. 
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ECJ can justify the articulation and application of "general princi-
ples. "73 The ECJ has used this mechanism to articulate and apply con-
sciously and deliberately a number of general principles of Commu-
nity law.74 These general principles include fundamental principles of 
human rights, which have been read into the jurisprudence of the 
European Union,75 as well as principles of equality of treatment and a 
number of principles derived from continental law. 76 
73 There is only one reference to "general principles" in the primary law. Article 
215(2) of the E.C. Treaty provides for E.C. liability in non-contractual matters, "in accor-
dance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States." E.C. Treaty 
art. 215(2). SeeJEAN VICTOR LOUIS, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 68 (1980) (suggesting 
that this is a specific reference to a: term of general applicability). However, the ECJ may 
have taken inspiration from other sources. See, e.g., LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 69, at 180 
(Art. 173 permits the ECJ to annul an act of the Community which infringes "the Treaty or 
any rule of law relating to its application."). 
74 See generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur 
Get'reide un Futtermittel 11/70, (1970) ECR 1125, (1972) CMLR 255. In Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ rejected the notion that the validity of Community measures 
could be judged by applying the fundamental or constitutional rules of any of the Member 
States. Instead, the ECJ suggested: 
However, an examination should be made as to whether some analogous 
guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect 
for fundamental rights has an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, while in-
spired by the constitutional principles common to the Member-States, must 
be ensured within the framework of the Community's structure and objective 
of the Community. 
Id. at 1134. 
75 See, e.g., Nold v. Commission, case 4/73 919740 ECR 491,508 (stating that the ECJ 
could draw on international instruments as sources for general principles of human rights 
against which Community law could be measured); see also Weiler, supra note 69, at 1113-
21. Weiler notes that there will be an element of constitutional politics at play in the 
crafting of this general principle of Community law; the incorporation of fundamental 
human rights into the Community legal order might be characterized as "an attempt to 
protect the concept of supremacy which was threatened because of the inadequate 
protection of human rights in the original Treaty system." See id. at 1119. 
76 Equality of treatment has been deduced from a small number of provisions in the 
E.C. Treaty that proscribe discrimination on the basis of nationality (art. 7), sex (art. 119) 
and production (art. 40(3». It has been applied to great effect in the area of gender 
equality. Council Directive 75/117, 1975 OJ. (L.45/19) (the Equal Pay Directive); Council 
Directive 76/207, 19 OJ. (L.39)40 (1976) (Equal Treatment Directive). 
Perhaps EU law has been as successful as possible in creating equality within a 
society where men have traditionally dominated the best paying and most re-
warding jobs, and have had more status than women. Women within the EU 
will now strive to challenge their historical role, knowing they have the Equal 
Pay and Equal Treatment Directives behind them in support of their efforts 
to obtain more prestigious and better paying jobs. 
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The process of identifying and interpreting general principles of 
community law by the ECJ, like the ECHR's interpretive project with 
respect to the Convention, is based on the identification of behavioral 
consensus and the memorialization of such consensus in the interpre-
tation of the basic documents of the EU in the context of the matters 
that come before the court. Both implicate the need for inherent 
normative consistency based on cultural consensus in the emerging 
meta-system of human rights. This normative consistency is simulta-
neously superior to and in opposition to the meta-systems of self-de-
termination and respect for cultural and national difference.77 
The ECJ sex discrimination cases Puk v. S. & Cornwall County 
Counci[78 and Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd.79 vividly demonstrate this 
opposition principle within the European Union. The former case 
represents the juridical role of identifying "that which is becoming;" 
the latter case represents the juridical role of identifying "that which 
is. "80 In Cornwall County Council, the ECl relied on its expansive inter-
pretation of "one of the fundamental principles of Community law" to 
determine that this fundamental principle prohibited employment 
discrimination against a transsexual.8! The ECJ rejected Britain's ar-
gument that termination of employment "because he or she is a trans-
sexual or because he or she has undergone a gender reassignment 
operation does not constitute sex discrimination for the .purposes of 
Elena Noel, Prevention of Gender Discrimination Within the European Union, 9 N.Y. 
INT'L. L. REv. 77,91-92 (1996); see generally, Ruth A. Harvey, Equal Treatment of Men 
and Women in the Work Place: The Implementation of the European Community's Equal 
Treatment Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38AM.J. COMPo L. 31 (1990). 
Principles derived from continental law include the principle of proportionality, which 
is akin to U.S. notions of the interpretive constitutional doctrine of "least restrictive 
means." See, e.g., EMILlOU, supra note 69, at 115-33 
77 "I hope to demonstrate that a cross-fertilization process is well underway, one that 
ultimately may lead to more harmonization of the law in ... human rights areas." Richard 
B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internationally: The Death IWw Phe-
nomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 699, 702 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (arguing 
for the need for the harmonization of international human rights law). Note, however, 
that recent voices have begun to sense that there is a "declining consensus on the role that 
the system established by the European Convention plays for the protection of human 
rights." Giorgio Gaja, Case Law: Court of Justice, opinion 2/94, Accession lJy the Community to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 33 COM-
MON MKT. L. REv. 973, 989 (1996). 
78 Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996). 
79 Southampton Indust. Tribunal, Case C-249/96, (1998) All ER (EC) 193. 
80 See Cornwall County Counci~ Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 247; Grant, Case C-249/96 at 
193. 
81 See Cornwall County Counci~ Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 263. 
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the directive."82 The British, of course, were right in a way; discrimina-
tion applied equally to men becoming women, as well as to women 
becoming men. Instead, the ECJ accepted the finding of the ECHR 
that transsexuals "form a fairly well defined and identifiable group. "83 
As such, discrimination against transsexuals could fall within the gen-
erous ambit of fundamental interdiction of sex discrimination.84 "To 
tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such 
person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or 
she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard."85 Here, 
the ECJ determined that transsexuals had become generally accepted 
as a sex. On that basis, it was neither new nor odd for the ECl to apply 
the law of sex discrimination to them. 
The ECl did not glean any such duty to safeguard when the dis-
crimination complained of was based on the complainant's sexual 
orientation. In Grant, a female public employee sought to challenge a 
rule denying her partner, also a woman, travel concessions that the 
employer made available to unmarried couples of the opposite sex 
who were in a meaningful relationship. The ECl could not here bring 
itself to apply the expansive interpretation of fundamental law it had 
recently articulated because that would have required the articulation 
of a standard of acceptable norm which it did not believe was yet ei-
ther a norm or generally acceptable. In the space between transsexual 
and sexual orientation, the ECl marked the boundary between 
identification and creation. Thus the arguments, which the court 
swept aside as ineffectual in Cornwall County Council, became compel-
ling in Grant. Britain made the same argument it had made in Corn-
wall County Councit-that the regulations do not constitute discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. This time the ECl agreed. Orientation is not 
gender; "[s]ince the condition imposed by the undertaking's regula-
tions applies in the same way to female and male workers, it cannot be 
regarded as constituting discrimination directly based on sex. "86 This 
language differs from that in Cornwall County Council, in which the 
same court declared such "discrimination [against transsexuals] 
82 [d. at 262, 263. 
83 [d. at 262-63. 
84 Cornwall County CQUncil, Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 262-63. 
85 [d. 
86 Grant, Tribunal, Case C-249/96 at'l! 28 (emphasis added). 
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based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person con-
cerned."87 
More importantly, the ECl refused to determine whether there 
was an equivalence between relationships among people of different 
sexes and those between people of the same sex. First, the Commu-
nity had not specifically legislated this equivalence, and, therefore, it 
was not the ECl's place to do it for them.88 Second, none of the Mem-
ber States had yet recognized the equivalence: "in most of them it is 
treated as equivalent to a stable heterosexual relationship outside of 
marriage only with respect to a limited number of rights, or else is not 
recognised in any particular way. "89 Third, even the ECHR had re-
fused to recognize the equivalence.9o Indeed, the ECHR had refused 
to extend the rights of transsexuals to marriage.91 Ms. Grant fared no 
better in her attempt to draw a direct equivalence between sex and 
sexual orientation. The ECl just would not push European norms 
when facing what it determined, through its political or social organs, 
to be the reluctance of society to practice those norms as a matter of 
course. Thus, even though the ECl traditionally has been aggressive in 
applying international human rights instruments in its interpretations 
of Community fundamental principles, it chose to resist such expan-' 
sion in a fairly uncharacteristic way for the ECl-it relied on the limi-
tation of the competence of the Community! The general principle of 
equality, at the heart of the expansive language of Cornwall County 
Council, crashes on the shoals of a limited view of Article 199's prohi-
bition of sex discrimination.92 The ECl ended by tossing the issue 
87 Cornwall County Council, Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 1 21 (emphasis added). The 
Grant court was not unaware of the distinct use of language. See Grant, Tribunal, Case C-
249/96 at , 42. However, the court implied that the difference in focus was the result of 
the difference in discrimination-orientation in Grant, gender in Cornwall County Council. 
88 See Grant, Tribunal, Case C-249/96 at 1 31. 
89 See id. at 1 32. 
90 See id. at 1 33 (citing a number of ECHR cases, including X v. UK (1983) 32 D & R 
220, Sv. UK (1986) D & R 274, B v. UK (1990) 64 D & R 278). 
91 See id. at 134 (citing Cosseyv. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990); Rees 
v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987». 
92 See id. at 1'1 43-47. Thus, the reading of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (New York, 16 December 1966; TS 6 (1977); Cmnd 6702) by the Human 
Rights Committee, established to interpret its provisions that sex includes sexual orienta-
tion, was dismissed as irrelevant because Article 119 was limited to "sex" and because the 
opinions of the Human Rights Committee ought not be accorded much dignity. See id. 
Rather, Article 119 must be read solely within the four corners of the Community Treaties. 
See id. 
Of course the ECj could not have meant what: it said. To do so would be to retreat 
from twenty years of interpretation of the scope and means of incorporating the principles 
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back to the overtly political process: The Treaty of Amsterdam93 pro-
vided for the political resolution of the issue of discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. It was, therefore, no business of the courts 
to resolve the issue before the political process had worked things 
out.94 This opinion is worthy of its American parallel, Bowers v. Hard-
wick.95 
Thus, general principles of Community law serve as a meta-
principle limiting the autonomy of law, even with respect to areas 
where the state has legislative authority. The U.S. equivalent is the 
enunciation of federal constitutional principles against the power of 
both federal and state political units. General federal constitutional 
principles supply the interpretative norms with which we understand 
our legislation.96 Constitutional principles, like general principles of 
Community law, are examples of the ways in which even the funda-
mental law of multi-state systems are bent to the will of contemporary 
common understandings of social norms. The European Court of Jus-
tice, like the U.S. Supreme Court, interprets the will of the sovereign 
as set forth in legislation through the lens of identification of com-
mon understandings. Each court memorializes "what is" or "what is 
becoming" through the act of interpretation. In this sense Cornwall 
County Council and Grant, essentially civil law cases, function much like 
U.S. federal constitutional cases, each wrestling with principles of in-
terpretation in the service of the current sense of good practice. 
of human rights within the Treaty framework. Instead, the ECJ was inartfully suggesting in 
the context of the transposition of human rights into the Community Treaties, the limita-
tion of Member State consensus. Since no European body had assented to this expansive 
reading of the rights of sexual minorities, and since the common practices of the people of 
the Member States did not show a patten or practice of acceptance of the state of affairs 
sought by Ms. Grant, then the ECj was in no position to impose that social norm. 
93 OJ. 1997 C340. . 
94 See Grant, Tribunal, Case C-249/96 at t 48. 
95 478 u.S. 186 (1986); see Larry Cata Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art 
of Diving Equal Protection, 32 TuLSA LJ. 361, 385-88 (1997). 
96 See generally Fairness as a General Principle, supra note 53. For example, consider Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), from the analytical perspective of the European Union. In 
Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an amendment to the Colorado state constitution 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. [d. at 635-36. The 
amendment, through a statewide voter referendum, precluded all legislative, executive, or 
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of 
persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships." [d. at 624. Colorado has the legislative authority to amend its constitution 
by popular referendum. See id. at 623. However, general principles of Constitutional law 
foreclosed the use of that power in ways that violated the harmonizing norms of the prin-
ciple of "equal protection." For a discussion of Romer, see Backer, supra note 95, at 37~8. 
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III. THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFICATION-MEMORIALIZATION BY COURTS 
IN THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Courts speak authoritatively when they identify and memorialize. 
Whether identification is focused on Logos (the so-called "rule of 
law") or vox populi (the will of the people), such pronouncements are 
accorded a certain amount of respect and, therefore, autonomy. It is 
this authority that stays the hand of those with the power to resist. The 
authority is so great that even Presidents of the United States will 
comply in the face of decisions reached by a furiously divided Su-
preme Court. President Truman, who had ordered the seizure of steel 
mills in the United States during the Korean War to secure the pro-
duction of war material, ordered the mills returned to their owners 
on the strength of an order of the Supreme Court,97 even though he 
bitterly disagreed with the judgment of the Court. 98 
To understand why society defers to the pronouncements of 
judges, we must understand how courts are understood when they 
speak, that is, we must give cultural context to the voices of the court. 
This exploration implicates the way in which the act of identification-
memorialization itself forms part of the core aesthetics of Western 
culture. This ·aesthetic involvement is neither linear, nor "clean." As 
the Biblical author Paul suggested, the way we have mediated this aes-
thetic conflict within the dominant culture is through a religiously 
aesthetic device: "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave 
nor free, there is no male and female, for ye are all one in Christ Je-
sus. "99 But of course, here again, saying it does not make it so. 
97 HARRY S. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS (1956) 476. The Supreme Court decision Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 (1952), involved the powers of the President under 
the federal Constitution and produced opinions by six justices. 
98 President Truman, in his memoirs, thus complained of the decision: 
I would, of course, never conceal the fact that the Supreme Court's decision, 
announced on June 2, was a deep disappointment to me .... I am not a law-
yer, and I leave the legal arguments to others. But as a layman, as an official of 
the government, and as a citizen, I have always found it difficult to under-
stand how the Court could take the affidavits of ... all who testified in great 
detail to the grave dangers that a steel shutdown would bring to the nation 
... and ignore them entirely. I could not help but wonder what the decision 
would have been had there been on the Court a Holmes, a Hughes, a Bran-
deis, a Stone. 
ThUMAN, supra note 97, at 476. 
99 GaL 3:26. Indeed Christian theologians and commentators have understood the 
power of the divine to provide an arguably neutral site for the mediation of social disputes 
and to provide a point of fundamentalist stability to the way society approaches such ques-
tions. "The Christian God has been a breaker of barriers from the first. All who have a 
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Judges derive authority from speaking the divine. Only when 
judges lose their individual humanity, when they become the conduit 
for the vocalization of the voice of God, can we say that judges speak 
with authority. Judges speaking personally, no matter how chic today, 
carry no authority. Such speaking is as powerful as the physical power 
of the speaker. Therefore, this power is never very great or durable. 
The nature of the voice with which the U.S. Supreme Court speaks 
has become a lively topic of debate within the opinions of the Court 
itself.l00 Yet when judges transcend the individual, when they serve as 
the vocal chords of the divine, then they speak with authority. Even 
the· reluctant submit to such voices, whether the divine resides within 
Logos or as the common law of a fickle society. 
Identification-memorialization implicates four constructs of basic 
engagements between institutions and society in the struggle to pro-
duce and reproduce popular culture. Two of these cultural patterns 
of authority are Greek and two are Hebrew. These constructs reflect 
the basic tension at our cultural bedrock between the Greek and the 
Hebrew. Their relationship is simultaneous and complex. They exist 
tightly bundled in the modern West. By unraveling them, we can be-
gin to appreciate the pulsating and contradictory impulses out of 
which our engagement with the authority of the judge is crafted. We 
can also begin to appreciate why judges are not priests, and why 
priests are not God. 
The two Greek constructs of authority are oracular and imma-
nent engagements. The divine here routinely intervenes and explains. 
This judicial voice is singular and uncontestable. It is the authority of 
Teiresias, "whose soul grasps all things, the lore that may be told and 
distinctively Christian experience of God are committed to the expansion of human fel-
lowship and to the overthrow of barriers." WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE 
SOCIAL GOSPEL 186--87 (1917). 
100 Thus, for example, in U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), a dissenting Justice 
Scalia scolded his colleagues for their constitutionalization of proscriptions of previously 
lawful single-sex state-supported educational institutions: "The people may decide to 
change the one tradition, like the other, through democratic processes; but the assertion 
that either tradition has been unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but poli-
tics-smuggled-into..!aw." Id. at 569 (Scalia,]. dissenting); see a~o Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 597 (1992) (religious invocations at school ceremonies prohibited under First 
Amendment). In Lee v. Weisman,Justice Scalia in dissent scolded the majority for a decision 
based on their "changeable philosophical predilections." Id. at 632 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
On occasion, though, Justice Scalia is able to weave his own "changeable philosophical 
predilection" into the fabric of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Court itself. See 
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (examin-
ing the use of peyote in ceremonial, native religious practice). 
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the unspeakable, the secrets of heaven and the low things of earth. "101 
It is also a voice to which society grudgingly submits, though submit it 
will-and by its own hand. There is also a bit of Cassandra in all such 
speech.102 The Greek engagements in identification-memorialization 
suggest the culturally expected pattern of pronouncement. Pronounce-
ment, in this sense, is both orderly and ordered. Control and modera-
tion, observation and detachment, are the metaphors of this force of 
pronouncement. The implication is one of perfect sight-either per-
fect vision of the past or of the present. These suggest place and stasis; 
there is no place to go. Within this voice is the culturally significant 
authority which must be obeyed. 
The two Hebrew constructs are cacophonous and tumultuous. 
The divine is present here but ultimately unknowable. All authority 
represents a striving to recapture the divine voice, which is both nec-
essary and doomed to at least partial failure. Here, drawing on the 
cultural power of Job's companions, the judicial voice is tentative and 
open to challenge. In the cultural form of the prophetic voice, 
authority moves from the court to the dissenting voices within the 
court. The Hebrew engagements suggest the culturally expected pat-
tern of engagement and hierarchy of truth. Humankind attempts to 
seek the way to the divine, comply with the law, or know the word of 
God: ''Yet Thou hast cast off, and brought us to confusion .... Where-
fore hidest Thou Thy face And forgettest our affliction and our op-
pression?"103 These engagements acknowledge the inevitability of al-
ways failing to attain complete and immutable truth or knowledge. 
Pronouncement, in this sense, is, by definition, incomplete and always 
potentially incorrect. Moreover, the process of arriving at pro-
nouncement will always contain within it its antithesis, the seeds of 
that pronouncement's own doom. These voices suggest a journey to 
perfection back to the place from which we came. : With this voice is 
the culturally significant authority to disobey. 
Judges act within the context of the Greek construct when they 
engage in the field of cultural production in their roles as "Homer" 
101 Sophocles, CEdifms the King, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES 77, 84 (Sir 
Richard ClaverhouseJebb, trans., Bantam Books, 1982). 
102 "Tunc etiam fatis aperit Cassandra futuris ora dei iussu non umquam credita Teucris. Nos 
dRluba deum miseri, quibus ultimus esset ille dies, festa valmus frondR per urbem. " ["Then to cap 
all, Cassandra opened her mouth for prophecy-she whom her god had doomed never to 
be believed by the Trojans. But we poor fools, whose very last day it was, festooned the 
shrines of the gods with holiday foliage all over the city."], VERGIL, THE AENID 42, Book II, 
lines 246-49 (C. Day Lewis, trans., Doubleday Anchor Books 1953) (19 B.C.). 
103 Psalms 44:10; 44:25. 
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and as "Delphic Apollo." The court acts within the context of its He-
brew construct when it engages in the field of cultural production in 
its role as "The Friends of the Job" and in its role as site of the articu-
lation of the Prophetic voice-of dissonance in the field of cultural 
production. Each of these constructs originates within our culture. 
Each is patterned after a process of cultural communication whose 
signifiers are so well understood that they form part of our uncon-
scious foundation of communication. Thus, in using these voices, 
courts need not affirm or define either their authority or their role. 
At the same time each voice carries with it the limits of its authority-
the extent of its competence within the field of cultural or normative 
production. I will speak to each of these roles in turn. 
A. The Greek Voices 
1. Court as the Stage for the Homeric 
When courts speak with the Homeric voice, they chronicle "what 
is." They speak here with the voice of the preserver-of the identifier 
and memorializer of our common traditions. This voice has thor-
oughly internalized the past.104 It is the voice of reassurance, the voice 
that reminds us that what we know "is." It is the storyteller of our oral 
tradition. Here we find ourselves at the core of the identification-
memorialization matrix, the competence of the Homeric courts lim-
ited to retelling the old stories and reassuring us of the continued 
power of these retold stories. 
The Homeric is the voice of our parents whom we beg to retell us 
the story we heard a hundred times before.105 Like that particular pa-
rental voice, the voice of the Homeric court is a voice that we demand 
perform in a very particular and limiting way. The story must be re-
told exactly as it was told before, and the context must remain un-
changed. If we hear the story in bed before we fall asleep we demand 
the story be told always when we are in bed before we fall asleep. The 
104 The Homeric voice I describe here has a Germanic counterpart, the saga society 
which existed among pre-Christian Germanic peoples. For an interesting view, see WIL-
UAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAw, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA 
ICELAND (U. Chi. Press 1990). For a perceptive commentary on Miller's work, see generally 
Richard A. Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1495 
(1990). 
105 Recall that both the Odyssey and the Iliad began as oral works, and they were not re-
duced to writing until at least the sixth century B.C. Richard Lattimore, Foreword, in 
HOMER, THE IUAD OF HOMER 13 (Richard Lattimore trans., U.Chi. Press 1951). 
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recitation itself becomes fetish and assumes a divinity of its own, 
sanctified in tradition. 
The language of American judges is full of the Homeric. While 
examples of the Homeric voice of courts are numerous, I content my-
self here with examples of just a few. The voice of Justice Scalia as-
sumes the Homeric with some regularity. In Romer v. Evans,loo the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court all spoke Homerically, but focused on 
different and conflicting strands of the common social understanding 
of the way things ought to be. On the one side stood Justice Scalia, 
fiercely reciting the story of the defense of common understanding of 
morality. On the other side stood Justice Kennedy, equally fierce in his 
defense of the bedrock understanding of American republicanism. I 
have suggested that: 
Romer illustrates the power of decisions which recognize at 
some subliminal level that sex is politics. In a sense, the 
Court merely confirmed what our political society had long 
held true-that everyone should be allowed to "play" the 
game of republican politics .... 107 "Homosexuals are forbid-
den the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without 
constraint. They can obtain specific protection against dis-
crimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to 
amend the state constitution. "108 The majority sought to do 
little more than to identify the basic rules within which re-
publican principles of politics works [sic] in this country. 
These are not new rules, or rules with no connection to ac-
106 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
107 Backer, supra note 95, at 384-85. In a recently published article, Michael Mann-
heimer refers generally to the Equal Protection Clause's "equal citizenship principle." See 
Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Establishment Clause: Equal Partici-
pation in the Community as the CentralLink, 691EMPLE L. REv. 95,114-17 (1996). 
lOS Backer, supra note 95, at 384 (citing Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996».Ju8-
tice Scalia, in dissent, had a far narrower view of what sort of political participation would 
be enough. Homosexual political advances are subject "to being countered by lawful, 
democratic countermeasures as well," including "the democratic adoption of provisions in 
state constitutions." Romer, 517 U.S. at 646, 647 (Scalia, j., dissenting). The problem/of 
course, as the majority saw, and as Justice Scalia's ideology could not fathom, is that our 
popular political culture does not permit the use of the democratic process to push any 
participant out of the ga'lTU!. And that is what the amendment at issue in &mer effectively did. 
The Justices spent some time considering this point at oral argument where the issue was 
crystallized. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument, Oct. 10, 1995, at 51-56, Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Ro11U!r Oral Argument], availabk in 1995 
WL 605822. As Jean E. Dubofsky argued on behalf of respondents, the question was 
whether the referendum process constituted a prohibited "restructuring of the political 
process." [d. at 51. 
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tual practice. The majority directed its inquiry to under-
standing the way in which Americans played the political 
game of republicanism in this century.l09 Indeed, the major-
ity relies on tradition to support their [sic] decision. no 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, correctly states-though he seems to 
fail to understand-the strength of that argument.111 Scalia's dissent, 
ironically, is also based on tradition, but of a different kind.1l2 In the 
end, Justice Scalia's traditional values had to give way to those cham-
pioned by the majority, and sensibly so-Colorado's legislature is as 
capable of protecting traditional moral values as is the population it 
represents. In the end, our founders chose for our political home re-
publican Rome, not democratic Athens.ll3 That choice imports with it 
a sense of the dignity of each of the citizens of that polity. Romer is a 
case in sync with that core social reality. 
Social policy is also an area ripe for the Homeric voice, especially 
in the United States. Consider the reasons a reputedly very liberal 
Court refused to construe the American Constitution as imposing on 
109 Backer, supra note 95, at 384. This characterization was especially true at oral argu-
ment. Thus, for instance, Justice Ginsburg drew analogies to the political give and take of 
the suffragists at the turn of the twentieth century. See Romer Oral Argument, supra note 
109, at 14 ("I was trying to think of something comparable to this, and what occurred to 
me is that this political means of going at the local level first is familiar in American poli-
tics.") . 
110 Backer, supra note 95, at 384 (citing Romer; 517 U.S. at 634-35). "It is not within our 
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law 
and our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government 
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance." Romer, 
517 U.S. at 634. 
111 "Lacking any cases to establish that facially absurd proposition [of the sort of state-
wide constitutional amendment through referendum at issue in the case], it simply asserts 
that it must be unconstitutional, because it has never happened before." Romer, 517 U.S. at 
647 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (emphasis added). That is precisely the point. Tradition mili-
tates against this sort of fundamental wrenching of political culture in the absence of evi-
dence of a substantial amount of acceptance of these rules in fact. 
112 "The Court today ... employs a constitutional theory heretofore unknown to frus-
trate Colorado's reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values." Id. at 
651. Indeed, the essence of Justice Scalia's textualist project is essentially Homeric-the 
retelling of law as it was heard the first time. "But the Great Divide with regard to constitu-
tional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and objective meaning, but rather 
that between ariginal meaning (whether derived from Framers' intent or not) and current 
meaning." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
113 SeeTHE FEDERALIST Nos. 10,39,63 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the state the fundamental obligation to provide social welfare benefits 
to all of its people: 
For here we deal with state regulation in the social and eco-
nomic field, not affecting the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment only because the regulation results in some dis-
parity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC 
families. For this Court to approve the invalidation of state 
economic or social regulation as "overreaching" would be far 
too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the Four-
teenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws 
"because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of har-
mony with a particular school of thought. "114 
Sex tends to bring out the Homeric in the European courts. The 
European Court of Justice attempted the Homeric voice in Grant.1l5 
The ECJ patiently explained the reality of social norms for those who 
would attempt to legislate social equality between heterosexual cou-
pling and homosexual coupling where no such social equality existed 
in fact within Europe.116 Ironically, both the House of Lords and the 
European Court of Human Rights spoke Homerically in R v. 
Brown,ll7 though each emphasized a different common understand-
ing. In the former case, the House of Lords took a very traditional 
view of sex play, and determined that what the defendants in that case 
engaged in was anything but sex: "They may be playing with the pri-
vate parts of others, but they are not engaging in sex as the courts are 
willing to define it. "118 Having attempted an encyclopedic explanation 
114 Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). 
115 Southampton Indust. Tribunal, Case C-249/96, (1998) All ER (EC) 193. 
116 See generally id. For a discussion of the rationale of the Grant court, see supra Part 
rr& ' 
117 House ofLords, (1994) 1 AC 212, (1993) 2 All ER 75, 124 (1993) 2 WLR 556, 157 
JP 337, 97 Cr App Rep 44,11 March 1993 (adult males who engaged in various same'sex 
sado-masochistic activities with much younger men convicted of keeping a disorderly 
house, and of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and wounding, contrary to the Of-
fenses Against the Person Act of 1861, §§ 47 and 20, respectively; the House of Lords, by a 
3 to 2 split, determined that consent in such cases could not be a defense to 'the charge). 
This case substantially restated the law in this area and has resulted in a tremendous 
amount of commentary. See generally, e.g., THE LAw COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER 
No. 134, CRIMINAL LAw: CONSENT AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON (1994) (U.K.); 
Carl F. Stychin, Unmanly Diversions: The Construction o/the HrmtOsexual Body (Politic) in English 
Law, 32 OSGOODE HALL L. REv. 503 (1994). 
liS See Backer, supra note 11, at 594. On the construction of the "sado-masochistic ho-
mosexual" by the House of Lords opinions, see Sangeetha Chandra-Shekeran, Critique and 
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of the traditional boundaries of permissible sadism and masochism, as 
it apples to sporting events and body mutilation, the Law Lords then 
distinguished unlawful sex play from other forms of sadism and maso-
chism as a function of the common practices of British society.119 The 
European Court of Human Rights, in contrast, spoke Homerically 
about the traditional boundaries of sex play. While sado-masochistic 
sexual practices may well be "sex," it is the sort of violent activity 
which a state may suppress.120 This sort of sex can be suppressed be-
cause, frankly, it terrifies and disgusts according to the common un-
derstanding of European society.121 Because a European consensus 
seemed to permit suppression of such conduct, the "margin of appre-
ciation" built into the European right of sex "free" of interference 
could be limited.122 
Common law courts have internalized the Homeric voice in the 
concept of stare decisis. Here we confront the lingering authority of 
past recitations of ''what is." Such prior recitations are now invested 
with omniscience, clarity and unity. That which is "must be" continues 
unless something fundamental changes. Thus, stare decisis, as a Ho-
meric device of authority, played a critical role in the determination 
Comment: Theorising till! Limits of till! "Sadomasochistic Homosexual~ Identity in R. v. Brown, 21 
:MELBOURNE U. L. REv. 584 (1997). The "problem" of conduct and sex, that is, of defining 
and redefining conduct as sexual for purposes of regulating "sex" or conduct outside of 
sex, see Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal 
Law, 11 CAN.]. L. &JUR. 47 (1998). This "problem" has proven pivotal in the investigation 
of the criminal activities of President Clinton. If what the President is described as doing is 
not considered "sex" by him, then it might well be hard to prove that he perjured himself, 
whatever Prosecutor Starr says falls within the definition of sexual activity. 
119 For an American critique of the decision as bad common law, see generally Brian 
Bix, Consent, SaM-Masochism and till! English Common Law, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 157 
(1997). On the problem of sex as object and descriptor, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, 
BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX (1993). On the general context 
of (homo)sexual discourse in law, and its relationship to social norm(ality), see generally 
LESLIE]' MORAN, THE (HOMO)SEXUALITY OF LAw (1996). 
120 The ECHR was willing to concede that the activity was sex, but also shared a com-
mon view that this sort of sex was dangerous and revolting. See Brown, House of Lords, 
(1994) 1 AC 212, (1993) 2 All ER 75, 124 (1993) 2 WLR 556, 157 JP 337, 97 Cr App Rep 
44, 11 March 1993. Moreover, it fell outside even the limits of toleration which Europeans 
had crafted for "normal" homosexual activity in cases like Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 142 (1988). Instead, Brown centered on an orgy in which the participants in-
cluded men barely old enough to legally consent, if that. More than one socio-cultural 
taboo was trampled in that case. It is no wonder that the ECHR chose the easy route there. 
121 See, e.g., Backer, note 11, at 594; see generaUy Stychin, supra note 117. 
122 This was the essence of the ECHRjudgement. No nation/people really likes sado-
masochistic conduct. No nation/people officially permits such conduct as specified in the 
Brown case. No nation/people fails to enforce the laws against such practices. Conse-
quently, the ECHR could use Brown to construct the reverse mirror image of Norris. 
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that abortion remained a fundamental right of American women.123 
In this case, the act of judges transcending themselves to make a pro-
nouncement of the divine is clearly visible. Had the justices voted 
their personal beliefs, the result might have been quite different.124 
2. Court as Delphic Apollo 
When courts speak as the Delphic Apollo they chronicle "what 
has become." They speak with the voice of the seer-not the seer into 
the future, but rather the seer of the present. This voice appears to 
create through the act of speaking; this voice is that of Justice Cardozo 
in Ultramarine Corp. v. Touche,125 which appears to create a new reality 
from out of the rubble of the old. 
This voice of the courts seems to transform things: legislators in 
judicial drag according to so-called conservative pundits. Of course, it 
is no such thing. What courts create in their role as Delphic Apollo is 
awareness of a thing. This is the Delphic form of identification. The 
Delphic Apollo does not, by giving voice to it, create the thing voiced. 
Yet it is this critical distinction between the creation of awareness 
through the identification of "what has become" and the creation of 
the norms themselves to which liberal modernism remains oblivious. 
Awareness is a powerful form of identification, especially as ex-
pressed in the language of the juridical. It becomes all the more pow-
erful with the Delphic when awareness comes for the first time. In this 
form, the memorialization of the identified norm or rule functions as 
the means for definition and articulation of "that which has become." 
Memorialization in the Delphic context serves to make that which was 
identified more "real." It conforms and propagates the awareness at-
tained through the Delphic pronouncement of that "which has be-
come. " The creation of the shareable norms function of memorializa-
tion assumes great significance in this context. Unlike the context of 
the Homeric voice, there is no history of similar pronouncements on 
123 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 
(1992). 
124 See, e.g., Susan M. Halatyn, Note and Comment, Sandra Day O'Connor, Abortion and 
Compromise/or the Court, 5 TOURO L. REv. 327, 331 (1989) (recounting testimony at Justice 
O'Connor's confirmation hearings). 
125 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (action for damages against accountant for neg-
ligent misrepresentation). Justice Cardozo begins the analysis of this famous opinion 
thusly: "I'he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace. How far 
the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical discourse." Id., 255 N.Y. at 
180, 174 N.E. at 445. 
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which memorialization can rest. Thus, here we find identification-
memorialization at its most fluid. 
In the United States, Roe v. Wade126 provides an archetypical ex-
~ple of Delphic pronouncement. Broum v. Board of Education127 pro-
vides another. In each of these cases, the justice speaking for the ma-
jority of the Court chose the moment to articulate consciously, and as 
persuasively as possible, the changed social landscape as seen by the 
Court. In one, the Court attempts to identify, and to memorialize, the 
new social consensus on the power of a woman to determine the fate 
of her fetus. In the other, the Court speaks of a new social under-
standing of the nature of the relationship between races in the United 
States. In both cases, the articulation of "what is becoming" aroused a 
tremendous reaction among those who would compel the State to 
continue to enforce "that which was. " 
The reinvention of fairness as a general principle of the Ameri-
can constitutional law of procedure provides another view of the Del-
phic. The definition of fairness, "meaningful notice and meaningful 
opportunity to be heard," was not changed. However, the common 
understanding of what those words meant in context changed radi-
cally. What had been the traditional means of depriving people of 
property pending suit through ex parte proceedings in replevin was 
found to violate basic principles offairness.128 Now, after two hundred 
years, common social consensus had changed; fear of unjust depriva-
tions had become more important. As a consequence, the Supreme 
Court determined that fairness required notice and a hearing prior to 
the deprivation.l29 Though the Supreme Court modified this bright 
126 See 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). 
127 See 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954). Even this long after the decision in Brown, legal 
academics continue to argue over the significance of the decision. Yet, though then is 
great disagreement over the nature of the significance of the decision and its cultural ef-
fects after its rendering, there is little disagreement that the Brown court sought to articu-
late the parameters of a changed social landscape. An excellent articulation of these dif-
ferent views of Brown's significance can be found in Vol. 80, No. 1 of the Virginia Law 
Review. See Klarman, supra note 10; David J. Garrow, Hapelessly Hololow History: Revisionist 
Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151 (1994); Gerald N. Rosenberg, 
Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to Canoniz.e a Case, 80 VA. L. REv. 161 
(1994); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 173 
(1994). 
128 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972). 
129 SeeSniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1969) (pre-
judgement garnishment of wages); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (depriva-
tion of welfare benefits). Justice Brennan explores the interest of the recipient in the 
stream of payments the state is obligated to provide to the eligible, much the way one 
would look at a retirement annuity for a retired person, or the wages of a poor worker. The 
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line definition in subsequent cases,IOO its initial pronouncement an-
nounced a sea change in the understanding of fairness, and, in that 
sense, it was Delphic. 
The human rights cases of the ECj provide a catalog of Delphic 
utterances. For example, prohibitions of discrimination on the basis 
of sex have taken on a life of their own in the ECj and have become 
more normalized within western European society.IlII Law, long dor-
mant on the books of the European Communities, suddenly has come 
to life. It is unlikely that sufficient social consensus existed to support 
the great crusade against sex discrimination until the 1970s in 
Europe. The ECl's extension of this principle to transsexuals, dis-
cussed above, was also Delphic. Unthinkable in the 1970s, transsexual 
rights became acceptable enough twenty years later. 
The ECHR's project of distilling European standards of moral 
conduct and imposing those standards throughout Europe evidences 
the Delphic project: 
In those matters where there has been a given legislative 
trend in several Member States of the Council of Europe it 
might seem possible to try to distill certain European stan-
dards. This is the case regarding the trend of decriminalizing 
homosexual conduct between consenting adults in private 
or, as in the recent Soering case, the practical abolition of the 
death penalty.132 
B. The Hebrew Voices 
1. Court as Friends of Job: The Impossibility of Perfection of 
Knowledge. 
The first of the Hebrew voices is a cacophony that introduces us 
to the collective voices of courts, none of which can speak with total 
reference, quite conscious, is to Sniadach. At the end of the analysis is Justice Brennan's 
conclusion that the consequences of erroneous deprivation is great: wHis need to concen-
trate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to 
seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 264. 
no See Mitchell v. W.T. GranrCo., 416 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1974); North Georgia Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 619 (1975); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1,22 
(1991). 
. 151 See, e.g., Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR 455; Chris Docksey, The Principks of Equality 
Between Women and Men as a Fundamental Right Under Community Law, 20 INDUS. LJ. 258-80 
(1991). 
152 Bengoetxea & lung, supra note 56, at 239. 
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clarity or coherence, and all of which grasp the object of cultural pro-
duction-but only imperfectly, incompletely, and temporally.l~~ Here 
the quality of the voice of the courts stands in contrast to the "Greek" 
voices of the court. The Hebrew voice is a non-linear voice, a human 
voice, rather than a divine voice. It is a shaky voice, confident but 
without the ability to rely on a direct connection to the divine. 
The Greek voice of Homer is confident in its recollection of his-
torical norms. The Delphic voice is confident in its ability to see "that 
which has become" amid the swirls of culture. However, the Hebrew 
voices operate without the patina of certainty. These voices are as 
confident as those of the Greeks, but they are also voices consciously 
in a world of imperfect knowledge. 
Who are these friends ofJob?134 As you might recall, after Job had 
been afflicted by God for the purpose of seeing if Job would curse 
God, three of his friends came to comfort him and help him under-
stand the reasons for his condition. Each of them sought to identify 
the cause of Job's afflictions and to suggest the means by which such 
affliction could be overcome. A fourth friend then reviewed the ef-
forts of the first three friends, found the answers advanced unsatisfac-
tory, and attempted a better understanding of the reasons for his suf-
fering. Let us examine each in turn: 
a. Eliphaz the Temanite 
Job was suffering because he had sinned. To ameliorate the suf-
fering, Job would have to go to God and lay his cause before Him. 
"Blessed is the man whom God corrects; so do not despise the disci-
pline of the Almighty. "1~5 But of course, Eliphaz misread what he saw, 
asJob had not sinned. 
b. Bildad the Shuhite 
Job was suffering because he would not admit that he had 
sinned-Job suffers for a failure to acknowledge wrongdoing (as op-
posed to suffering solely for the wrongdoing). To ameliorate the suf-
fering, Job must admit the offense and then plead with the Almighty. 
us The best aural/visual image of this is the famous debate scene between the Jewish 
scholars in Strauss' opera, Salome. HEDWIG LACHMANN, SALOME (music by Richard Strauss, 
Dresden, 1905) (based on the play by Oscar Wilde (orig. in French», Scene 4a (Jews and 
Nazarenes) [hereinafter SALOME]. 
1M See gmeraUy Job. 
IS5 [d. at 5:17. 
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"Does God pervert Justice; Does the Almighty pervert what isjust?"136 
But of course Bildad also misperceives, for Job has no sin to acknowl-
edge. To acknowledge sin where none exists is to engage in empty 
gestures. 
c. Zophar the Naamathite 
Job was suffering not merely because he sinned or failed to ac-
knowledge such a possibility, but because he knew he sinned, refused 
to acknowledge it, and, when confronted with the reality that the sin 
was observed, sought to hide it. Job thus suffers for covering up the 
sin. "Surely he recognizes deceitful men; and when he sees evil, does 
he not take note?"137 Zophar was wrong, however; Job has no sin to 
cover up or confess. 
d. Elihu the Buzite 
He rejects the counsel of the other friends as partially correct 
and suggests thatJob was suffering to be trained and molded by God. 
Job must be satisfied to take instruction and learn what he can from 
the experience. 
The story of Job ends with a twist that we find unable to replicate 
within culture. God interrupts the great cacophony of argument 
among the friends of Job. He delivers the "right" answer which the 
friends attempted to identify and memorialize as "written" on the 
body of Job. The right answer is that there is no answer that we are 
capable of identifying or understanding. ''Where were you when I laid 
the earth's foundation?"138 "Would you discredit my justice? Would 
you condemn me to justify yourself? Do you have an arm like God's 
and can your voice thunder like His?"139 
Our Jobian voices of authority bring us face to face with the ju-
ridical as human, stumbling to understand the divine. These are the 
"feet of clay" of our Greek perfection. For courts can approach 
identification; they may memorialize their understanding of ''what is" 
or ''what is in the becoming," yet both enterprises remain incomplete 
and, therefore, deceptive, if only by omission. Utterances in the Greek 
voices are comforting because they speak to us in a single voice about 
a single perspective. We can understand these and act accordingly, if 
136 Id. at 8:3. 
137Id. at 11:1l. 
138 Id. at 38:4. 
139 Job at 40:8-9. 
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we are of such a mind. Or we can rebel, understanding the object and 
nature of our rebellion. But Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar, or Elihu remind 
us that the juridical (and even the legislative) voice can also be poly-
tonal. What is implicit in the cultural undergirding of our Greek 
voices--the gods each speak with a singular voice, but there are many 
gods working at cross purposes--is at the heart of the authority of the 
Biblical voices of the juridical. 
, Polytonality in authority is so ingrained in law-making within 
common law systems that we are no longer even conscious of its fun-
damental influence in shaping the way in which society hears and 
processes the voices of authority. Still, we understand its dynamics. 
Who but a person steeped in common law traditions can see its work-
ings so brilliantly portrayed in the disputation scene of the learned 
doctors of Jewish Church law in the Strauss opera Salome. l40 Who has 
not heard this scene repeated in any of the multiple opinions com-
mon to the British tradition? Who has not heard the American ana-
logue in the multiple opinions common in the most contentious cases 
before the U.S. Supreme Court? 
Yet, it is not enough that the Biblical voices are polytonal; the 
Hebrew voices evidence transitoriness as well. Culture has attributes 
of the divine; it is dynamic. Its presence can be felt, and it provides 
force and structure, but it cannot be contained within any system of 
140 SAWME, supra note 133. The legal question facing Herod was the jurisdiction of 
Jewish Church officials, and whether the Church had authority over John the Baptist. Five 
doctors of Jewish law come to make their case before Herod: 
First Jewish Official: Truly, my lord, it were better to deliver him into our 
hands. 
Herod: Enough of this! I will not deliver him into your hands. He is a holy 
man. He is a man who has seen God. 
FirstJewish Official: That cannot be. Since the prophet Elias no man has seen 
God. He was the last man who has seen God face to face. In these our days 
God doth not show himself. God Hideth himself. Therefore great evils have 
come upon the country, great evil. 
Second Jewish Official: Verily, no man doth know if Elias indeed saw God. Per 
adventure it was but the shadow of God the he saw. 
Third Jewish Official: God is at no time hidden. He showed himself at all 
times and in all places. God is in what is evil even as He is in what is good. 
FourthJewish Official: Thou shouldst not say that, it is a very dangerous doc-
trine that cometh from Alexandria. And the Greeks are Gentiles. 
Fifth Jewish Official: Thou speakest truly. 0 yes, God is terrible. But as for this 
man, he hath never seen God. Since the prophet Elias no man has seen God. 
Id. And so we begin again, through another set or perambulations, this time speaking si-
multaneously, until in frustration, Herodias commands them to be still and the Nazarenes 
provide yet another view. 
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pronouncement and systemization. This description is as true of uni-
tary systems of pronouncements as it is of polytonal systems. All such 
systems, all such pronouncements, will necessarily be contingent and 
partial. However, the process of identification-memorialization re-
mains a static enterprise. It captures a moment's pause in the rela-
tionship between people; it also captures the momentary consensus in 
the engagement of groups with the social text that defines the behav-
ioral rules governing their interaction. 
The poly tonality of the courts reminds those who listen that no 
pronouncement of the present is either stable or comprehensive. 
Likewise, the voice of perfection-the voice of Homer or the Delphic 
Apollo-can serve only as a temporally limited stopping place. They 
are markers within a dynamic system that point to their own obsoles-
cence. They provide comfort-the understanding of the place "where 
we have been" or "where we have arrived "-but they cannot provide 
either repose or tranquility. The cacophony of the juridical provides 
the imperfect noise within which we can engage in cultural herme-
neutics. Within the juridical we are all Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar, or 
Elihu. We are sure of our knowledge of what we see and confident of 
our authority to declare and impose. 
Consequently, our courts declare in the "perfect" tense of our 
Greek voices. The courts rely on their ability to Hellenize their voices 
to assert a perfect authority for the acceptance of their particular 
pronouncement. Yet this perfect tense can be heard in the "imper-
fect" tense of Hebrew challenge. Behind these Hellenized voices are 
the uncertainties, the blindness to the divine, at the core of our He-
brew voices. The four friends of Job also provide our foundational 
metaphor for the necessary uncertainty and, therefore, the cacoph-
ony of the juridical voice. American postmodernists might describe 
this uncertainty as the limitations arising from tht: "situatedness" of 
juridical analysis.141 The divine has drawn a curtain separating itself 
from humanity, yet leaves it to humankind to reach the divine without 
the benefit of divine knowledge. We may witness, we must accept, but 
we can never really know that we are right. Consider that not o~e of 
the friends of Job is possessed of the whole of wisdom; each can see 
only as far as the wisdom accorded him permits, but lacking the whole 
of wisdom, none can speak entirely authoritatively. 
141 See generally STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT's A 
GOOD TmNG, Too (1994). 
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Each of the friends of Job possesses a part of what makes wisdom 
complete; that is, each holds a partial key to divine wisdom. For 
Eliphaz, the key to wisdom and divine authority is observation and 
experience of life; empirical data provides authority to declare.142 
Bildad finds wisdom complete in history: knowledge and understand-
ing inherited from the past provide the key to authority for future ac-
tion; tradition provides its own authority.143 Zophar demonstrates the 
way in which intuitive understanding provides authority; logic and 
inspiration provides its own authority.I44 Elihu finds that with author-
ity comes acceptance of "that which is": authority comes from obedi-
ence: "I get my knowledge from afar; 1 will ascribe justice to my 
Maker. Be assured that my words are not false; one perfect in knowl-
edge is with yoU."145 The ECHR's long struggle with the age of con-
sent for consensual sexual relations between people of the same sex 
contains flashes of the imperfect wisdom of the friends ofJob. l46 
Possession of only a part of divine wisdom permits our judges to 
be completely wrong. The only source of un situated or complete wis-
dom in the story of Job is God. But God alone, of all of the partici-
pants in the Jobian story, will not speak. The juridical voices aspire to 
divinity-absolute authoritativeness. However, the Jobian story makes 
clear that such authoritativeness is to be denied us.147 When judges 
are perceived to speak with the voices of any friends of Job, such pro-
nouncements made in those voices lose much of their authority. 
These are judicial voices which cannot be ignored, but which can be 
discounted. An alternative is available; it is humankind speaking, not 
the divine. 
At first blush, this might appear to be a tragic moral. But the op-
posite is true. For the Biblical voice confirms our liberation from the 
absolute tyranny of human authority. The Jobian voice is a liberating 
voice by its very marginality. For in this story, all of us are outside the 
juridical; we are Job himself. We overrule or ignore the declarations 
142 SeeJob 4:7-8; 5:3, 27. 
143 See id. at 8:8-9; 18:5-21. 
144 See id. at 11:6; 20:1-29. 
145 Id. at 36:3-4. 
146 See Helfer, supra note 64, at 1059, 1059 n.105. 
147 Justice Scalia's observation in Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc. is most perti-
nent here: "The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation 
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured 
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed." 523 U.S. 75,82 
(1998) (finding same-sex sexual harassment cognizable under statute at issue and rejecting 
blanket rule excluding this form of harassment from statute). 
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made on our behalf. We are well used to the art of limiting cases to 
their facts. We are also well versed in the art of ignoring declarations 
and pronouncements we find "unhelpful." Even courts will act like 
Job from time to time. Romer v. Evans provides a wonderful example 
of this art. In a case about the power of the state to limit the availabil-
ity of the political process to sexual non-conformists, the majority ig-
nored the most significant case declaring ''what is "-Bowers v. Hard-
wickI48---in favor of a different declaration.149 
Indeed, because Jobian voices limit authority, there is a 
significant likelihood that Jobian pronouncements will be tested and 
re-tested. Until there is social consensus and juridical articulation of 
that consensus, the issue will continue to plague the courts. Thus, 
race relations, homosexuality, and abortion, to name only a few issues 
in the English-speaking world, remain problematic in society and be-
fore the courts. Examples of the voices of the friends of Job abound. 
Moreover, many common law multi-judge courts appear to operate 
like the friends of Job. When all judges speak, and they say different 
things, they may appear as the friends of Job, though each of the 
judges speaking assumes the voice of Homer or that of the Delphic 
oracle. 
The six opinions filed in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia150 pro-
vide a striking example of the Jobian paradigm in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that all racial classifications imposed by the state must be 
analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard, virtually assuring that no 
such classification program would survive. I51 Together, the opinions 
overlap like a complex, intertwined coiling ball of snakes. Justice 
O'Connor: 
announced the judgement of the Court and delivered an 
opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV, 
which was for the Court except insofar as it might be incon-
sistent with the views expressed in the concurrence of Uus-
tice] Scalia ... and an opinion with respect to Part III-C. 
Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV of that opinion were 
joined by [Chief Justice] Rehnquist, and Uustices] Kennedy 
148 See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
149 See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Backer, supra note 95, at 384-85. 
150 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (examining constitutionality of federal minority set aside pro-
grams for contracts). 
151 Id. at 202. 
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and Thomas, ... and by Uustice] Scalia ... to the extent 
heretofore indicated; and Part III-C was joined by Uustice] 
Kennedy. Uustices] Scalia ... and Thomas ... filed opinions 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Uus-
tice] Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Uustice] 
Ginsburg joined. . .. Uustice Souter filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Uustices] Ginsburg and Breyer joined .... Uus-
tice] Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Uustice] 
Breyer joined .... 152 
Each of the judges sought to speak with a Greek voice. Taken to-
gether, however, the voices blend together into a Jobian cacophany. 
The polyphony itself steals the divine fire from the court's pro-
nouncement. The effect, of course, is to lessen the impact of the for-
mal decision.153 The only decision of the Adarand court that is likely to 
survive is that society is in transition and critically undecided about 
the value of minority preference programs because they violate cer-
tain economic core taboos. The Adarand problem will be raised again 
152 Id. 
153 At least one current member of the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, when 
she was sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, expressed some tentative criticism of 
multiple opinions, if only when a justice is moved to write for the "wrong" reasons. Among 
the "wrong" reasons identified, following Richard Posner, were to register a minor reserva-
tion, suggest an additional reason for the result, criticize a dissenting opinion, or set out 
the writer's own interpretation of a majority opinion. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on 
WritingSeparafRly, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133,149 (1990) (citing, in part, RICHARD POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 233, 239-41 (1985». However, Ginsburg notes, 
"Hard cases do not inevitably make bad law, but too often they produce multiple opin-
ions." Id. at 148 (citing in part POSNER, supra, 233, 239-41). The result of opinion prolif-
eration, for then Judge Ginsburg, would be a movement "toward the Law Lords' pattern of 
seriatim opinions, each carrying equal weight, and under which 'the English lawyer has 
often to pick his way through as many as five judgements to find the highest common fac-
tor binding on the lower courts.'" Id. at 149 (citing, in part, L. BLOM-COOPER & G. DRE-
WRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACITY 90, 523 
(1972». 
For an academic critique of multiple opinions, see, e.g., Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong 
with the Supreme Court, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 686 (1990). Bator states: 
Id. 
Most important and most distressing is that they are addicted, too, to the mul-
tiplication of individual opinions. Nobody seems to take seriously the notion 
that the Court should try very hard to speak with a single intelligible voice. 
The endless proliferation of independent opinions is, in my opinion and with 
all due respect, a disgrace .... And the sad result is that, all too often, when 
the Supreme Court decides a case, instability and uncertainty and confusion 
are not alleviated, but, rather, reinforced. 
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and again.154 When the court babbles like the friends of Job, society is 
free, like Job, to reject the authority of the pronouncements. 
Yet even civil law-based courts without true multiple opinions, 
like the EC], will sometimes show the faces of the friends of Job. A re-
cent case, interesting in this regard, was Grant, in which the ECJ de-
parted from the recommendation of the advocate general,155 That 
fissure has not been closed by the magisterial and somewhat patroniz-
ing tone of the EC] opinion. A careful reader of both advocate gen-
eral and court will clearly see where the consensus has unraveled with 
respect to the ambit of tolerance allowable to sexual non-conformists. 
The old consensus, that gay men and lesbians should be grateful that 
they are left alone, is under attack. The new consensus, that the rela-
tionships of gay men and lesbians should be treated with a dignity 
equal to relationships between men and women, is subject to fero-
cious resistance. Neither side won a clear-cut victory in Grant. Uni-
formity would have been impossible in a society which has not made 
up its mind on the matter. Only time will tell whether the court or the 
advocate general spoke with the more authoritative voice.156 
The Brown case suggests patterns of engagement and conflict 
within English society.157 The old social consensus on the boundaries 
of sex are being tested. The results so far are inconclusive even within 
British society.158 The final result in Britain and, thereafter, within the 
ECHR, though reflecting a conclusion with binding effect, more read-
154 The same result is observable in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In each case, society took the juridical voices for 
]obian disputation. What followed in each case was constant retesting of the norms 
affirmed in each case. &e v. Wade has almost thirty years of juridical and legislative attacks 
at the federal level. Bowers v. Hardwick has seen the same level of attack, but with a strong 
focus on the states and state normative law making. 
155 See generally Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., Southampton Indust. Tribunal, Case 
C-249/96, (1998) All ER (EC) 193. 
156 The EC] chose not to adopt the advocate general's aggressive approach to the cov-
erage of the fundamental principle of equality articulated in Cornwall County Counci~ nor 
the actual advocate general opinion in Grant, itself. For a discussion of the advocate gen-
eral's opinion in Cornwall County Counci~ see generally Larry Cata Backer, Harmonization, 
Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the Dynamics of opposition Within Federative and 
International Legal Systems, 4 ThLSAj. COMPo & INT'L L. 185 (1997). For an American's de-
scription of the advocate general's opinion in Grant, see generally, e.g., Paul L. Spackman, 
Note & Comment, Grant V. South-West Trains: Equality for Same-Sex Partners in the European 
Community, 12 AM. U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 1063 (1997). 
157 For a perceptive analysis, see generally Stychin, supra note 117. 
158 The divergent opinions in Brown plainly attest to the uncertainty of the pro-
nouncement. One might even argue that the need to "restate" the law and to devote a 
substantial amount of space to proof of the verities of the revision is strong evidence of the 
sense that "someone" needs convincing. 
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ily demonstrates the fissures in the old consensus within Europe as 
well. The divergence between the House of Lords and ECHR at the 
margins of the opinions attests to the fact that the boundaries of sex 
and violence have been significantly problematized. No adequate sub-
stitute has been proposed. Litigants will surely press the courts to re-
visit this issue again and again until a new social consensus is estab-
lished. The fissures reveal the Jobian in the process of European 
norm-making through law. 
2. Court as Old Testament "Prophet": A Site for Struggle 
With the prophetic voice, we confront a different kind of court in 
the field of cultural production. The voice that becomes paramount 
in this form of juridical cultural production, or norm-setting, is not 
the ''voice'' of the court. Beneath the outward formal product of the 
court-the opinion of the court, or the statement of the "law"-is a 
most significant byproduct of the production of juridical declarations. 
The court, in producing the official identification of "law" also 
identifies those voices that may have challenged the view officially 
adopted. This identification of rejected views may simultaneously cre-
ate "byproducts" as important for the production of cultural "truth" as 
the formal opinion itself. As such, the act of identifying and memori-
alizing provides a site for the expression of "rejected" visions of ''what 
is" or ''what has become." The courts provide a site for contestation of 
our interpretation of "what is." It is here that the voices of the pro-
phetic may speak. 
Consider the nature of the prophetic-voices raised against the 
current iteration of behavioral norms:159 "And I will turn My hand 
upon thee, And purge away thy dross as with lye, And will take away 
thine alloy; And I will restore thy judges as at the first, And thy coun-
selors as at the beginning. "160 These voices are of transformation; they 
compel change. These voices reject the act of identification in favor of 
creation. The prophetic compels; law exists apart from, yet acts on, 
society. Social custom and general agreement do not constitute law; 
159 Isaiah 1, 25-26. "Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves; Everyone 
loveth bribes, and followeth after rewards; they judge not the fatherless, Neither doth the 
cause of the widow come unto them." Isaiah 1 :23. Isaiah lived during the time of the de-
struction of the Kingdom of Israel by the Assyrians in 721 B.C. SAMUEL SANDMEL, THE 
HEBREW SCRIPTURES 83-84 (1978). For a standard history of Ancient Israel, see H.M. OR-
UNSKY, ANCIENT ISRAEL (1960). For a study of the historical value of the Bible, see gener-
ally SANDMEL, supra, passim. 
160 Id. at 1 :25-26. 
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law descends from a greater source, already constituted and requiring 
obedience.16l This voice punishes; it is the voice of Ezekiel-stern, 
uncompromising, promising punishment for failure to conform con-
duct to the vision of the prophet. This voice is that of norms una-
dopted. The prophetic holds the promise of the future; yet at the 
same time, the prophetic holds the danger of oblivion for those who 
enjoy the present. "And I will scatter thee among the nations, and 
disperse thee through the countries; and I will consume thy filthiness 
out of thee. And thou shalt be profaned in thyself, in the sight of the 
nations; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord. "162 
For the prophetic speaker, the cultural imperative of the pro-
phetic is judgment. Social customs are judged deficient. The commu-
nity is given a choice: conform to a different standard of conduct or 
suffer the consequences. The cultural imperative of the prophetic is 
also punishment. We are well aware of the destruction of Sodom, the 
Kingdom of Israel, and the Kingdom of Judea for failure to conform 
to "law." Layered above judgment and punishment is the cultural im-
perative redemption. Had God but found ten righteous people, 
Sodom would have been spared.163 Yet for the listener, for society and 
culture, the cultural imperative of the prophetic is that it must be ig-
nored and reviled, at least for a time. For good or ill, our cultural 
practice compels the marginalization of the voices of prophets. Mter 
all, these are the voices which would make over social practice, the 
voice of deluded romantics. The abolition of slavery, the prohibition 
of alcohol consumption, equality betw'een the sexes, universal suf-
frage, respect for the rights of animals, marital rights betw'een men or 
betw'een women-all of these have been or are romantic vision, and 
161 A passage from Jeremiah states: 
Thou therefore gird up thy loins, and arise, and speak unto them all that I 
command thee; be not dismayed at them, lest I dismay thee before them. For, 
behold, I have made thee this day a fortified city, and an iron pillar, and bra-
zen walls, against the whole land, against the kings of Judah, against the 
princes thereof, and against the people of the land. And they shall fight 
against thee; but they shall not prevail against thee; For I am with thee, saith 
the Lord, to deliver thee. 
Jeremiah 1 :17-19. Jeremiah lived through the final religious revival ofthe' Kingdom of 
Israel immediately before its destruction by Babylon in 586 B.C. This period witnessed 
significant international convulsions, e.g., the fall of Assyria and the rise of Babylon and 
Egypt. SeeSANDMEL, supra note 159, at 139-40. 
162 Ezekiel 22:15-16. Ezekiel, the protege of Jeremiah, was among those carried off into 
exile in Babylonia after the destruction of the Kingdom of Judea in 586 B.C. See SANDMEL, 
supra note 159, at 160. 
163 See Genesis 18:32. 
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those who give them voice are considered crazy for a time.l64 Some of 
these voices are still considered crazy today. 
The prophetic are therefore the popularly rejected voices 
chronicling "what should be." By custom, we reject this voice on first 
hearing. So rejected, the prophetic should have little effect in the 
work of producing culture, but the opposite is true. It is true that this 
construction of the culturally expected pattern of the prophetic-
providing a site for the expression of the currently unattainable-
creates a source for the expression of normative possibilities which 
can then be digested by the culture or not. Had Israel and Judea but 
conformed to the "law" rather than to the evolving consensus of 
acceptable social practices, then they too would have been spared.l65 
Yet there is a cultural positive to the voice of the prophetic. In 
our cultural bones we have been taught to regard the prophetic as 
divine communication. This voice must be heeded eventually; we have 
been well-taught to heed the words of the prophetic. We may not 
come around to it in the lifetime of any set of listeners, but we have 
been taught to listen. The penalty for extended deafness is severe. 
Indeed, the lesson of listening and the fear of the consequences 
of heedlessness are built into the structure of our memorialization of 
the formal expressions of norm identification by the courts. Consider 
the function of opinions in the United States. In a sense they serve to 
chronicle the declaration of the authority, but, at the same time, they 
serve as a record of the expressions of the Prophets. So memorialized, 
they may work within culture as it seeks to interpret and reinterpret 
itself. Within the narratives that courts spin as jurisprudence is pre-
cisely the place where the rhetoric of transformation may be most ef-
fective at what it can do best-pursuing the public good. Professor 
Lobel has the right of it in his very interesting study of famous cases in 
which the Supreme Court refused the invitation to "transform " the 
164 "Learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed,Judge the fatherless, plead for 
the widow." Isaiah 1 :17. 
165 A careful reading of Prophets highlights this point. Each spoke of the catastrophe 
waiting for Israel for its social intransigence. This point is made explicit in Chronicles. One 
example will suffice: 
And Manesseh made Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to err, so that 
they did evil more than did the nations whom the Lord destroyed before the 
children of Israel. And the Lord spoke to Manesseh, and to his people; but 
they gave no heed. Wherefore the Lord brought upon them the captains of 
the host of the king of Assyria, who took Manesseh with hooks and bound 
him with fetters, and carried him to Babylon. 
2 ehron.33:9-10. 
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law.I66 He argues that losing cases, arguments made and rejected in 
the courts, "represent a prophetic vision of law, stemming from the 
Old Testament prophets such as Amos who viewed justice as 'a 
fighting challenge, a restless drive.'"167 Unlike Professor Lobel, I be-
lieve that the "prophets" theory applies both to cases in which the 
court rejected the invitation to "transform" society and those in which 
it did not. Both Bawers and Romer serve the same purpose. Both will be 
equally effective in changing social mores (which is to say, hardly at 
all). 
The importance of the juridically prophetic within the produc-
tion of culture, and then through the production of culture, back to 
the juridical identification of culture, is archetypically exemplified by 
the odyssey from Plessy to Brawn. The Court in Plessy acted as the Ho-
meric voice, expressing the reality of social convention with respect to 
the construction of boundaries between peoples classified in accor-
dance to this thing we named "race." The Court rejected out of hand 
the prophetic voice of Justice Harlan, who in dissent eloquently 
pleaded for the adoption of a different vision of "what ought to be." 
Yet the prophetic voice was not suppressed. It was accorded a dignity 
equal to that of the Homeric expression of the majority in the process: 
of memorialization. Thus memorialized along with the majority ex-
pression of "what is," the prophetic vision coursed back into the non-
juridical (social) fields of cultural production, there to provide guid-
ance to individuals and groups attempting the process of applying 
and reapplying, interpreting and reinterpreting, the working rules,of 
popular culture.I68 Fifty years later, the prophetic reappeared before 
166 See generally Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Praphets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1331 (1995). 
167Id. at 1333. Certainly, at a minimum, such cases begin the long and painful process 
of educating judges about the existence of alternative realities. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sund-
quist, 926 S.W. 2d 250,266 (Tenn. App. 1996) (finding state Homosexual Practices Act in 
violation of state constitution and describing argument propounded by state in support of 
continued criminalization of private sexual conduct between people of same sex). Justice 
Sears' dissent in Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188,191 (Ga. 1996) is also instructive. 
168 See generally, e.g., Michael]. Klarman, supra note 10. Professor Klarman notes: 
There exists a widespread tendency to treat Brown as the inaugural event of 
the modern civil rights movement. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The reason the Supreme Court could unanimously invalidate public school 
segregation in 1954, while unanimously declining to do so just twenty-seven 
years earlier was that deep seated social, political, and economic forces had 
already begun to undermine traditional American racial attitudes. 
Id. at 13-14; see also id. atl3-75 (describing the socio-cultural changes preceding Brown). 
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the Court. However, in Brown, the Court identified what had been the 
prophetic voice in Plessyas the "what is" of Brown. 
IV. SITUATING JURIDICAL VOICES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
CULTURAL PRODUCTION 
I have developed the notion of the limits of the competence of a 
court's role in the field of cultural production within the concept of 
identification-memorialization. I have then addressed the issue of 
communication within the identification-memorialization matrix by 
positing that the courts use language models drawn from the deepest 
recesses of our culture. These models are the basis of the authority to 
pronounce and contain within them the limits of the power of the 
pronouncement. I have also suggested that these communicative roles 
are not neat, and they make flesh one of the more interesting ten-
sions within Western Christian culture-a tension which has been un-
resolvable for the last 2000 or so years, the tension between our Greek 
and Hebrew constructs. I have also attempted to identify the poten-
tially conflicting and cacophonous voices and to demonstrate their 
limitations in the production of the culturally identifiable and its 
memorialization. 
I want now to place this model in the context of the messiness 
which is our cultural engagement. This messiness suggests Panu 
Minkkinen's reading of Foucault's examination of "law as matrix."169 
Minkkinen seeks an understanding of the juridical within the domain 
of power-knowledge. The structural regularity of diverse social prac-
tices reveals the epochal matrices that Foucault understands as law, 
and law, in turn, designates the way in which the matrical framework 
of the visible domain of an epistemeboth forms the discursive domain 
and enables its dissemination. Law is, then, not a practice, be it dis-
cursive or non-discursive, but the 'juridico-epistemological' matrix of 
a given epoch through which the social world penetrates language. 
Through its formative or ordering aspect, law enables the recognition 
of the social in language, but, at the same time, its disjunctive or 
conflictive aspect accounts for the dissemination of a discursive cor-
pus into new utterances of a second order.170 
However, these interactions also proceed internally, within the 
juridical. In particular, the dialogue within the juridical reflects the 
169 See Panu Minkkinen, The Juridical Matrix, 6 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 425, 433-36 
(1997). 
170 See id. at 441. 
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complexities, the nonfixitivity, within the juridical matrix which mir-
rors the dialogue between law, the speakers of law, and the social do-
main. There is as much structural regularity within the juridical as 
within the object of juridical mediation, that is, between law and the 
social domain.17l 
I suggest that juridical voices within cultural communication exist 
as a series of contingencies which defy the power to draw lasting com-
fort from the process of juridical pronouncement. Juridical speaking 
is a complex act. The simple model for judicial authority based on 
culturally significant Greek and Hebrew voices represents the weave 
of our cultural conversations unraveled. I want to consider the nature 
of the complexities of such speaking by reweaving these strands of 
cultural authority. 
First, courts are not unitary actors; they are not monolithic enti-
ties. Courts are multi-voiced, and multi-sited. Any particular pro-
nouncement may well be in multiple voices. Courts may speak as the 
Delphic Apollo, while providing the site for the prophetic and slip-
ping into the voices of the friends of Job. The juridical matrix is 
multi-headed. Each judge is permitted an independence that belies 
the unity of the discourse about the juridical. Though we choose to 
speak of the juridical the way we speak of the Divine, the juridical is 
not a singularity. Most judges tend to attempt the Homeric or Delphic 
voice. Those voices, after all, provide the most commanding posture 
for a judge seeking to maximize the authority of his or her pro-
nouncement. Ironically, many such speakings tend to become more 
Jobian than Greek. Once uttered, judicial pronouncements are char-
acterizable primarily by the audience of people who must determine 
the quantum of authority they wish to confer on such pronounce-
ment. 
Second, all combinations are possible. The process of pro-
nouncement is messy. There is no rule book for limiting voice or in-
terpreting discourse. Sites for the pronouncement of law are neither 
conscious of the voice of authority on which they rely, nor can they 
control a shifting of that voice even within any particular panel of 
authority. Just as there is no singularity within the juridical, so there is 
no predictable singularity within the juridical. Multi-judge courts, like 
most appellate and high courts, become sites for simultaneous speak-
171 Leslie Moran has argued eloquently about the relationship of juridical and legisla-
tive speech to the articulation of a constructed "homosexual" body. See generally LESLIE J. 
MORAN, THE HOMOSEXUAL(ITY) OF LAw (London: Routledge 1996). Indeed, the articula-
tion of the body serves also as the identification and coalescing of a common social norm. 
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ing in all possible voices. Recall that in Romer, both Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy spoke Homerically, yet each drew on very different tradi-
tions to come to ~pposite conclusions. Both the Law Lords and the 
judges of the ECHR spoke of traditional common understanding, yet 
one was convinced that no sex had occurred and the other that the 
state was free to regulate the sex that took place. 
Third, no culture "speaking," and especially no juridical "speak-
ing," comes with its own definitive evaluation. There is no "God" or 
arbiter to tell us when courts speak in which voice or how long culture 
stops to affirm and practice what has been identified as "law." The col-
lective "we" are, in this sense, as a group, always in the place of Job or 
perhaps in the place of the suppliant before the Delphic Apollo. We 
are audience and not arbiter in a large sense. We are deluged with 
conflicting voices of the juridical, all pronouncing, all definitive, all 
deficient. One can really understand the frustration of Herod in that 
famous disputation from the opera Salome or the anger of Job. 
Yet we must all also perform the role of arbiter on a personal 
level. As we attempt to internalize pronouncement, or understand the 
application of norms in our practice of culture, we do interpret, ac-
cept, reject, and apply, in individual ways, that which may be 
identified to us by these voices of authority. Here is the form of the 
dialogue between practice and pronouncement. Authority is meas-
ured by compliance. 
Fourth, there is no one "culture" to which the juridical speaks. 
We may speak of "dominant culture," that is, coercive culture or disci-
plinary culture, as the primary target of the identification-
memorialization process of the juridical. For that purpose, we must 
accept the notion of the juridical as a site for discipline. In this sense, 
one can understand the identification-memorialization process as one 
of protecting or projecting hegemony. It is a popularizer and social-
izer of acceptable conduct and acceptable thought. 
However, the juridical permits the expression of the prophetic as 
well. The prophetic works against the present; to the extent it exists, it 
represents the potential for modulation of culture. Here, I conceive 
of culture as the collective of behavioral or thought taboos. But the 
prophetic may speak to non-dominant hegemonies as well. It provides 
a basis for resisting the colonization and harmonization implicit in 
the dominance of dominant culture. 
Most importantly, dominant culture rarely stands alone. The 
voices of the juridical speak with far less authority to sub-dominant 
culture. Sub-dominant culture has its own voices for identifYing and 
policing the current iterations of the form of its hegemonies. These 
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may well be impervious to the voices of the instrumentalities of the 
dominant group. Consider the ability of the people of Israel to insu-
late themselves from some (but not all) of the disciplining effects of 
dominant Christian culture from the beginning of the common era to 
the present. Resistance, of course, is never complete-how can it be? 
We understand the power of colonization and normalization of the 
dominant. Where a minimum of necessary harmonization is una-
chievable-in the eyes of the group with the greatest coercive 
power-then rejection and expulsion become the means of dealing 
with fundamental difference. 
Complexity comes to those who may belong to multiple he-
gemonies. How does the devout Muslim in America interpret, with 
what authority does he hear, the pronouncements of the juridical on 
the status of women? With what ears does the devout Catholic hear 
the Delphic voice of the court identify the reality of the cultural ac-
ceptance of reproductive autonomy for women? Within this complex-
ity, the authority of the juridical may be softened through the trope of 
"interpretive mistake. "172 As products in the field of cultural produc-
tion, the judicial voice may be discounted as speaking on issues of cul-
tural interpretations outside the field of the juridical. We accept the 
notion of the possibility of mistake, even from the divine Greek voices 
of the court. Indeed, the friends of Job provide a deeply embedded 
cultural form of processing mistake. 
Moreover, culture does not provide a group or individual guide 
for interpreting mistake. We may measure obedience, but we are leery 
of gauging interpretive mistake within culture. The limiting case is the 
overthrowing of the core taboo itself, but the power to conclude that 
an interpretive mistake is possible is also the power to limit the 
authority of those products of the juridical production of culture.173 
In this enterprise we are permitted a substantial amount of individual 
space in our private affairs. We are given substantially less space within 
the cultural public space.174 
172 I will contrast the notion of interpretive mistake with the notion of violation' of ba-
sic behavioral taboos. While the ambit of interpretation may be wide, there are, within any 
temporal expression of popular culture, interpretations so basically "off" that they violate 
the taboo and are beyond the pale of interpretation. On the matrix of the interpretively 
possible and that which lies beyond, see Backer, sUJn'a note 11, at 16-18. 
173 For an interesting example, involving the litigation over the identity of the Mash-
pee Tribe, see Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REv. 
1149,1180-87 (1997). 
174 For a discussion of the way in which culture talks publicly and privately, to different 
effect, see generally Larry Cam Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminali-
342 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 20:291 
V. HOLDING BACK ON ITSELF: LITIGATION AND CULTURAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN THE JURIDICAL FIELD OF CULTURAL 
PRODUCTION 
I have posited a complex model of juridical speaking within the 
context of the production of culture norms-behavior models. The 
model posits that there is no "production" of law; rather, law and ju-
ridical pronouncements are part of the production of culture. This 
model views the juridical enterprise in a manner fundamentally dif-
ferent from that which has come to be accepted as "truth" within the 
Anglo-American West. The modernist model with which we have been 
raised misunderstands both courts and the litigation processes they 
oversee in its attempt to separate law and juridical pronouncement 
from the cultural fields in which they are embedded. Modernism also 
errs by investing them with powers and qualities that are alien to their 
structure as well as to their siting within society. 
Both lawyers and non-lawyers have been raised, especially as par-
ticipants within the juridical field, on the notion of juridical speech in 
the messianic voice.175 The juridical process and, especially, its formal-
ization in the "litigation process," as well as the "product" of that pro-
cess-"law"-have been given positive functions. Law transforms; it 
moves society in peculiar and predictable ways-as long as we can get 
courts or legislatures to "go along." Law and the process of pro-
nouncement by courts become autonomous functions. When coupled 
with the unquestioned authority of the judicial voice (though why the 
voice is unquestioned defies explanation other than one deriving 
from the strength of force of arms), juridical cultural production is 
assertively transformative. It works on this other autonomous "thing" 
(culture), forces it to accept its prescriptions for conduct, and then 
uses the culture so domesticated to force compliance by the obedient 
populace. 
zation of Private Sexual Conduct, the ModRl Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 
FLA. L. REv. 755 (1993). 
175 What applies to modern scholarship applies with even more force to the nature of 
the voice of judicial authority: "Thus, to a certain degree, critical theorists can sometimes 
fall into the very old Marxist-Leninist trap: it is one thing to identifY racism and patriarchy 
(just as it was to identity capitalism) as an evil; it is quite another to assume or argue that it 
inevitably follows that naming the evil will result in its destruction or transmorgrification. It 
is error to assume that something like the normative substructure of our law and society is 
weak, unsupported, decrepit, decadent, or inevitably (and quickly) doomed to oblivion, 
only to be replaced by a new world order." Larry Cata Backer, By Hook or By Crook: Confor-
mity, Assimilation and Liberal and Conservative Poor Relief Theory, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 
391,434-35 (1996). 
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In place of that model, I have offered something considerably 
more passive and complex. It is messy and hard to gauge, even as a 
matter of history. In this sense, we will always be the creatures of our 
own interpretive limitations or matrices. It is a model which makes it 
more difficult to commit the modernist sin of essentialism-"courts 
are always this" or "courts are invariably that." 
Yet this model I have described here does contain within it the 
possibilities of manipulation, though of a vastly different order from 
that assumed possible under our current modernist conceptualiza-
tions. Litigation and law, understood as part of the process of cultural 
production, can be mobilized consciously in the production of popu-
lar culture. Litigation is an excellent site for the articulation of differ-
ent interpretive visions within culture, which, when freed, can work in 
society to modulate the ways in which cultural rules are interpreted. 
I leave you with examples to which I have already referred. Plessy 
was not overturned in an act of imperial will by the court in Brown. 
Rather, the interpretive, if prophetic, possibilities, inherent even in 
the days of Plessy, were freed to roam and percolate through society 
for several generations, to come back triumph ally as the formal voice 
of "that which is becoming" when the court was confronted fifty years 
after Plessy, with the need to acknowledge the ways in which culture 
had modulated. Likewise, the ECHR could not force the societies un-
der its jurisdiction to tolerate gay men to an extent greater than they 
desire, nor was it willing to compel such a action by bringing the age 
of consent into parity. Neither the English nor the European courts 
would impose on their societies an acceptance of practices generally 
considered disgusting, especially when compounded by the fact that 
the activity was engaged in by gay men, a group just barely tolerated. 
The prophetic voices generated by those cases will need to roam 
within our culture for a while. Should the day come when that pro-
phetic vision embraces "that which is becoming," then will the courts 
identify and memorialize the change. 

